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Abstract
In this study, I am working on the relationship between coalition formation and
bargaining. More specifically, I use a baseline cooperative bargaining model in
which a group of agents with symmetric single peaked preferences form coalitions
to bargain with a principle. I use this model to study the effects of the underlying
bargaining process on the structure of the coalition formed by the agents, and to
classify the properties that form a grand coalition. Later on, I also introduce an
alternative cooperative bargaining model to understand the connection between the
bargaining process and coalition formation.
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O¨zet
Bu tezde koalisyon olus¸umu ve birlikte pazarlık arasındaki ilis¸ki aras¸tırılıyor. Her
bir oyuncunun tek tepeli simetrik tercihleri olan temel bir pazarlık modeli
tanımlanıyor. Oyunculardan koalisyon olus¸turması isteniyor. Daha sonra bu
koalisyonu temsil eden simetrik tek tepeli tercih, dıs¸sal bir sosyal sec¸im kuralı ile
olus¸turuluyor. O¨nceden belirlenmis¸ bir yo¨netici ile koalisyonu temsil eden simetrik
tek tepeli tercihin pazarlık yapılacag˘ı belirtiliyor ve bu pazarlık sonucu dıs¸sal bir
pazarlık kuralı ile belirleniyor. Ortaya c¸ıkan pazarlık sonucu her bir ajanın pazarlık
sonucu oluyor. C¸alıs¸manın amacı, pazarlık su¨recinin koalisyon olus¸umuna etkilerini
ve bu¨tu¨n toplumun u¨yesi oldug˘u bir koalisyonun nasıl olus¸turulabileceg˘ini
aras¸tırmak. Tezin ilerleyen kısımlarında, temel pazarlık modelinde bazı deg˘is¸iklikler
yapılıyor. Bu deg˘is¸iklig˘in amacı; farklı modeller u¨zerinde pazarlık su¨recinin
koalisyon olus¸umuna etkilerini aras¸tırmak.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Bargaining takes place between two or more parties over an object or monetary
amount or a policy. The result of the bargaining process is the agreement of all
interested parties or disagreement. We can observe many examples of bargaining;
social interactions, such as in government policies and international organizations’
decision processes.
For example, recently there has been a debate over the arms embargo over Syria.
French and British governments are lobbying with EU members about lifting the
arms embargo to help rebels in Syria. UK prime minister, David Cameron, and
French president, Franc¸ois Hollande’s insistence to fellow leaders about the embargo
most likely will not work. Germany’s stand point is opposite to French and British
lobbyers about supporting the rebels in the civil war of Syria that has caused the
death of approximately 70.000 people. Opponents argue supplying rebels with arms
may encourage the Assad’s supporters such as Russia and Iran to pursue more ag-
gressive policies. EU foreign policy chief Catherina Ashton said the EU needed to
think “very carefully” about French and British arguments that lifting the embargo
would encourage Assad to negotiate.
We see that this is a policy bargaining for the actions of EU. EU members form
opposing coalitions that negotiate with each other so that they can determine a sin-
x
gle policy that binds all EU members. In this example, we observe that there exists
an interplay between bargaining and coalition formation.
Another example is a new legislation “Employee Free Choice Act” that was intro-
duced into both chambers of the U.S. Congress on March 10, 2009. This legislation
brings the old arguments about the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The
debate is about the membership of employees to a union as a part of the employ-
ment contract. We should focus on the United States Supreme Court decisions in
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) versus General Motors. The decision was:
“It is permissible to condition employment upon membership, but membership, in-
sofar as it has significance to employment rights, may in turn be conditioned only
upon payment of fees and dues.”1 Therefore employees do not have to pay full union
dues. The payment will be the portion of dues that covers the costs of collective
bargaining, contract administration, grievance adjustments, but not the costs of po-
litical, ideological, non-representational activities. The new act EFCA brings some
changes. The certification of the union as official will depend only on majority vote
of employees. There will be no other additional ballot as a demand of employer.
The act also increases penalties to employers who discourage workers to union in-
volvement. EFCA is a significant and controversial bills facing the Congress. Its
opponents have attempted to portray the bill as a radical, undemocratic and dan-
gerous piece of legislation that would disenfranchise millions of American workers
and damage an already fragile economy. And the supporters claims that EFCA can
restore the economic stability and division of labor, giving more workers a chance to
form unions and get better health care, job security, and benefits.
As you can see there are controversial ideas over these types of legislations
(NLRA, EFCA) because its effects over unions (coalitions) is unobservable for the
1LABOR BOARD v. GENERAL MOTORS, 373 U.S. 734 (1963)- 373 U.S. 734- NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.- No. 404.- Argued April
18, 1963. Decided June 3, 1963.
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time being. Conventional wisdom suggests that collectivism and centralization is
advantageous for employees and that the individualism of employees is more advan-
tageous for employers. Part of this thesis shows that conventional wisdom fails since
it is not always beneficial to form a grand coalition. This example also a good indi-
cation of the interplay between the bargaining and coalition formation process. The
new legislation defines new rules of coalition formation, which in turn cause different
coalitions.
To model the above issues, we will use a simple model of bargaining and coalition
formation. Suppose we locate policy alternatives along a one-dimensional political
spectrum. On the left is the communist party and on the right is the liberal one. This
left-right axis or Downsian axis was first introduced by Downs (1957, Chapter 8) [10].
This model indicates that voters with single peaked preferences choose alternatives
closest to their most preferred outcome. Hence the peaks of the people who vote
for the same party will be close to each other. Since political parties construct their
policies in order to get the maximum amount of vote at the corresponding political
spectrum, Downsian model suggests that policies will converge to the position of
median voter. The idea of this thesis comes from the question: “What if we impose
an exogenous bargaining process in a Downsian model?”. This exogenous bargaining
process consists of two stages. At the first stage, an exogenous social welfare function
(check definition 1) will determine a representative preference of the agents inside
the coalition. Agents outside the coalition is bound by the representative preference
of the coalition. At the second stage, the representative agent (representative pref-
erence of the coalition) and principal will bargain. An exogenous bargaining rule
(check definition 2) will determine the outcome of bargaining between the represen-
tative agent and the principal. It is crucial that the coalition outcome binds each
agent inside the society and there may not be unique coalition. I will then alter the
model by allowing individual bargaining along with coalitional bargaining with the
principal.. With these models, I aim to characterize the conditions over bargaining
and social welfare function to form a grand coalition.
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We have two models in this thesis; representative coalition and non-representative
coalition models. In representative coalition model we allow only one coalition. This
single coalition has the power to dictate its agreement with the principal to all
agents. In this model, every agent decides whether to be a member of the coalition
or not.The formed coalition then bargains with the principal. In non-representative
coalition model we allow individual bargainers along with a single coalition. This
model is an alteration of the restriction on coalition formation at representative coali-
tion model. For detailed explanations check the subsections (4.0.1) and (4.0.2).
As I mentioned before, we aim to characterize the assumptions over bargaining
and social welfare functions to form a grand coalition. In representative coalition
model, we have classified the assumptions over bargaining and social welfare func-
tion to form a grand coalition. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 together show that grand
coalition can be achieved, under certain assumptions over bargaining rule and so-
cial welfare function. As a by product of this classification process, we classify the
assumptions over bargaining and social welfare functions to form an unconnected
coalition by Theorem 3. Unconnected coalition refers to a coalition which is not con-
nected (check definition 5). Connected coalition is a coalition with agents that have
consecutively ordered peaks. If two agents i1 and i2 are inside a connected coalition
S and there is another agent i3 with pi1 ≤ pi2 ≤ pi3 , then agent i3 is a member of the
coalition too. Note that Theorem 3 indicates that conventional wisdom fails even
under strong assumptions such as Pareto efficiency and monotonicity. And finally
in non-representative coalition model, Theorem 4 shows that we can not produce a
grand coalition if we allow individual bargainers to the bargaining process.
xiii
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Cooperative Bargaining
Before we mention the literature on coalition formation, we need to focus on the
cooperative bargaining literature. Cooperative bargaining theory is originated on
paper by Nash (1950) [21]. Nash modeled the negotiation processes and defined an
axiomatic methodology to analyze that sort of models. The modeling of negotiation
process consists of identifying the alternative agreements and their values for the
negotiators that is, the implications of each agreement and disagreement. Coop-
erative bargaining theory focuses on producing methods to identify and determine
desirable bargaining rules. In his paper, Nash proposed the Nash bargaining rule
which maximizes the product of each negotiators’ utility gain with respect to their
disagreement payoffs.
Kıbrıs (2010) [16] provides an extensive review of cooperative bargaining theory.
He summarizes and surveys the cooperative bargaining literature starting with Nash
(1950) [21] to more recent studies. With the guidance of Kıbrıs (2010) [16] paper,
we are going to focus on the most well-known bargaining rules which are Nash,
Kalai-Smorodinsky, Egalitarian, and Utilitarian.
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Let’s start with different characterizations of Nash bargaining rule. Nash showed
that his bargaining rule uniquely satisfies Pareto optimality1, symmetry2, scale in-
variance3, and independence of irrelevant alternatives4. There are several studies
on Nash bargaining rule. Some of them alter Nash’s model such as changing the
structure of the feasible set or disagreement point. Others search for new properties
for the characterization of Nash bargaining rule without changing the model. Roth
(1979) [24] works on both types. He studies n-person games in which agents try to
reach a unanimous agreement. Each agent has a veto right. If there is no unanimous
decision then the result of the game will be some ex-ante disagreement point. In this
context, Roth works on Nash’s model of bargaining (formal model, risk posture) and
other models of bargaining. He introduces different properties over Nash bargaining
rule at formal model chapter. Roth indicates that Pareto optimality is the strongest
assumption among other assumptions of Nash’s. Pareto optimality requires that
the selection of the solution will be a “good” outcome in every bargaining game.
Therefore, Pareto optimality eliminates most of the potential outcomes, including
the occurrence of a disagreement. Instead of the collective choice assumption Pareto
optimality, Roth imposes individual rationality5. He shows that it is essentially un-
necessary to impose the requirement of Pareto optimality in order to derive Nash’s
solution. Then Roth imposes the property strong Individual rationality 6. He shows
that strong Individual rationality together with other properties except symmetry
implies strong Pareto optimality 7. In risk posture chapter, he proposes a risk com-
ponent to utility function of bargainers. He shows that a utility function is risk averse
if it is strictly concave. Then he compares the risk aversions of utility functions for
1Pareto optimality of an agreement means that not all bargainers benefit from altering to another
agreement
2A bargaining rule F is symmetric if for each permutation pi of negotiators, pi(S) = S and
φ(d) = d implies F1(S, d) = . . . = Fn(S, d)
3A bargaining rule F is scale invariant if for each (S,d) and for each positive affine function λ
F (λ(S), λ(d)) = λ(F (S, d))
4Let S1 ⊂ S2 and (S1,d),(S2,d) ∈ B such that if F (S2, d) ∈ S1 then F (S1, d) = F (S2, d). The
agreement of a bargaining problem would not change if we decrease the size of the feasible set.
5For any bargaining game (S,d), F (S, d) ≥ d
6For any bargaining game (S,d), F (S, d) > d
7For any bargaining game (S,d), if x and y are distinct elements of S such that x ≥ y, then
F (S, d) 6= y
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money. Major point here is to see how risk aversion enters into Nash’s model of
the bargaining problem. He deduces that, “In a two player bargaining game, making
player 2 more risk averse has the effect of making Pareto optimal set of utility payoffs
more concave as a function of player 1’s utility.” Hence, as player 1 becomes more
risk averse the utility of player 2 increases which is assigned by Nash solution. He
also defines risk sensitivity 8. He shows that: “ The Nash solution is the unique solu-
tion for two players games which possesses the properties symmetry, independence of
irrelevant alternatives, Pareto optimality and risk sensitivity.”. Boldness 9 and fear
of ruin10 are other two definitions Roth proposed. He finds that: “The player who
is bolder with respect to an equal division of the available money obtains the larger
share according to Nash solution.” Roth suggests that players which are completely
informed of one another’s preferences as captured by their utility function is not
always the case. Suppose players know one another’s preferences only over riskless
events, but not over lotteries. Even in this case, the player’s attitude towards risk
would influence the bargaining process only indirectly or even not at all. Therefore,
we need a wider class of transformations than these required by scale invariance
property. In this context, Roth construct a theory of bargaining which depends only
on the ordinal transformations 11 contained in the players’ utility functions. Then he
defines a new property Independence of ordinal transformations12. Independence of
ordinal transformations is a stronger property than scale invariance. He shows that
no solution which possesses Independence of ordinal transformation can also possess
independence of irrelevant alternatives and strong individual rationality. Now in this
chapter, he considers a model with less information than the previous models of this
book. And it is possible in the class of monetary games to identify the outcome
8If a two person game (S,d) is transformed into a game (S’,d’) by replacing player i with a more
risk averse player, then Fj(S
′, d′) ≥ Fj(S, d)
9Consider the game (S,d) with two players such that w1 and w2 are their initial wealths and
players bargain how to split Q dollars. A feasible proposal is (c1, c2) such that c1 + c2 ≤ Q. A
player’s boldness with respect to (c1, c2) is bi(wi, ci) :=
u′i(wi+ci)
ui(wi+ci)−ui(wi)
10Inverse of boldness
11Each player’s preference ordering over riskless alternatives.
12For any bargaining gam (S,d) in B∗ and any continuous, order preserving functions mi,
i = 1, . . . , n , let the bargaining game (S’,d’) be defined by S′ = m(S) ≡ {y ∈ Rn|y =
m(x) for some x ∈ S} and d′ = m(d). Then fi(S′, d′) = mi(fi(S, d)) for any i = 1, . . . , n
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of equal division of available money, and this is the unique outcome selected by an
ordinally independent solution which is symmetric and Pareto optimal on the class
of monetary games. There are other papers who works on new properties. Peters
(1986) [22] works on simultaneous bargaining situations on different issues by two
bargainers. The axiomatic approach is the same as Nash indicated. He shows that
(Partial) Superadditivity13, homogeneity14, weak Pareto optimality 15 characterize
a family of proportional solutions 16. He also shows that, in addition to individ-
ual rationality and Pareto continuity17, the axioms of restricted additivity18, scale
transformation invariance19, and Pareto optimality gives an alternative character-
ization of a family of solutions consisting of all non-symmetric extensions of Nash
solution. Lensberg (1988) [19] shows that the Nash solution is the only one to satisfy
Pareto optimality, anonymity, scale invariance, and stability. He also weakens the
Pareto optimality by using stability axiom and still characterizes the Nash solution.
Dagan, Volij, and Winter E. (2002) [8] provides an alternative characterization of
Nash bargaining solution by replacing Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with
three axioms which are Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives20,
Twisting21, and Disagreement Point Convexity22.
13σ(S + T ) ≥ σ(S) + σ(T ) for all S, T ∈ B. Partial Super additivity: σ(S + T ) ≥ σ(S) and
σ(S + T ) ≥ σ(T ) for all S, T ∈ B
14σ(xS) = xσ(S) ∀S ∈ B, x ∈ R+
15σ(S) ∈W (S) for all S ∈ B
16For every p ∈ R2 with p ≥ 0 and p1 + p2 = 1, the bargaining solution Ep : B → R2 is defined
by {Ep(S)} = W (S)∩{xp|x ∈ R, x > 0} for all S ∈ B. Ep is called the egalitarian or proportional
solution with weighted vector p
17σ is continuous on (B, pi) where pi is the metric on B defined by pi(S, T ) := dH(P (S), P (T )) and
dH is the Hausdorff metric .Let X,Y be non-empty sets such that d(x, Y ) := inf{d(x, y)|y ∈ Y }
and d(X,Y ) := sup{d(x, Y )|x ∈ X} and hausdorff metric dH(X,Y ) := max{d(X,Y ), d(Y,X)}
18S ∈ B is called smooth at x ∈ S if there exists a unique line of support of S at x, and where
σ is a bargaining solution. Restricted additivity: For all S and T in B, if S and T are smooth at
σ(S) and σ(T ) respectively, and σ(S) + σ(T ) ∈ P (S + T ), then σ(S + T ) = σ(S) + σ(T )
19A scale transformation a = (a1, a2) is a vector inR2++ := {x ∈ R2|x > 0}. Scale transformation
Invariance: σ(xS) = xσ(S) for all S ∈ B, x ∈ R2++
20A bargaining solution satisfies independence with respect to non-individually rational alter-
natives if for every two problems (S,d) and (S’,d) such that IR(S, d) = IR(S′, d) we have
f(S, d) = f(S′, d). (IR(S, d) is the set of individually rational points in (S,d))
21Let (S,d) be a bargaining problem and let (s¯1, s¯2) ∈ f(S, d). Let (S’,d) be another bargaining
problem such that for some agent i = 1, 2 S \S′ ⊆ {(s1, s2)|si > s¯i} and S′ \S ⊆ {(s1, s2)|si < s¯i}.
Then there is (s′1, s
′
2) ∈ f(S′, d) such that s′i ≤ s¯i
22For every bargaining problem B=(S,d), for all s ∈ f(S, d) and for every λ ∈ (0, 1) we have
s ∈ f(S, (1− λ)d+ λs)
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Papers which alter the Nash’s model such as changing the structure of the feasi-
ble set or disagreement point are also part of the cooperative bargaining literature.
Chun (1988) [5] studies bargaining processes which are constructed by unknown fea-
sible sets, and known disagreement points. The reason he works on this subject
is to formulate axioms which specifies the effects of the characterization of feasi-
ble set and disagreement points over bargaining solution. Peters and Van Damme
(1991) [31] provides a new characterization of n-person Nash bargaining solution
without independence of irrelevant alternatives. They also characterize continuous
Raiffa solution23. Different from Chun (1988) [5], they mainly focus on axioms which
acts on the changes in the disagreement point and leave the feasible set fixed. Chun
and Thomson (1991) [7] introduce a claims (expectations) point to disagreement
point and feasible set. Agents may have these claims when they bargain. They as-
sume that the claims point is not an element of feasible set. And they investigate the
response of bargaining solution by changing the feasible set, the disagreement point
and the claims point, the number of agents. Each change leads to the proportional
solution which is the maximal point of the feasible set on the line segment connecting
the disagreement point to the claims point.
Now I will provide the literature on Kalai-Smorodinsky rule which focuses on
different characterizations of it. In most cases, we can consider bargaining process
as step-by-step interim settlements such that each settlement is a start point for new
negotiations. We can thus construct interim settlement approach in Nash’s bargain-
ing framework. For two player bargaining problem, Raiffa (1953) [17] proposed two
different solution methods that use this idea. The first one is considering the interim
agreement discrete. The outcome that gives a player her maximal utility while keep-
23Let CR denotes the continuous raiffa solution. Let (S, d) ∈ B and let h(S,d) denote the utopia
point of (S,d), where hi(S, d) := {xi| x ≥ d}for i=1,2. If d < h(S, d), then let RS be the unique
solution of the differential equation (dx1/dx2) = rS(x) (x in the interior of S) with RS(d1) = d2,
where rS(x) is the slope of the straight line through x and h(S,x). For this case CR(S, d) ∈ P (S)
is defined to be the limit point of the graph of RS . Otherwise CR(S, d) be equal to the unique
Pareto optimal point weakly dominating d.
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ing the other player at her disagreement is the most preferred outcome. The interim
agreement is the average of most preferred outcomes of the two players. By using
this outcome as a disagreement point in each step, the process converges to a Pareto
optimal point of the bargaining set. In his second solution, Raiffa proposed that
the process is continuous in the direction of the average of the two most preferred
points. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) [15] focused on two person bargaining prob-
lems. They showed that taking monotonicity axiom 24(For every utility level player
1 will demand, the maximum feasible utility level player 2 can simultaneously reach
is increased, then the utility level of player 2 is increased at the solution.) instead
of IIA, there is a unique solution which is different from the Nash solution called
the KS solution. We can observe that both Nash’s solution and the KS solution are
continuous functions of the pairs (S,d). Thomson (1980) [29] shows how to generalize
two person bargaining solution of Raiffa to n-person bargaining solution. There are
two characterizations under two new monotonicity definitions along with the usual
axioms Pareto optimality, Symmetry and Invariance. Dubra (2001) [11] works on
standard two person bargaining problems, and defines a restricted Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives25(If the ratio of the utopia points is fixed as we passing to
a smaller feasible set and original choice remains in the smaller feasible set, then
they would choose again the same point.) along with other familiar axioms except
symmetry and shows an asymmetric version of KS solution. He also observes that
restricted version of IIA is compatible with Individual Monotonicity. 26
We focused on the literature review of classifications of Nash and KS solution
24For a pair (a, S) ∈ B, let b(S) = (b1(S), b2(S)) such that b1(S) := sup{x ∈ R| for some y ∈
R, (x, y) ∈ S} and b2(S) := sup{y ∈ R| for some x ∈ R, (x, y) ∈ S}. Let gS(x) be a function
defined for x ≤ b1(S) such that gS(x) :=
{
y if (x, y) is the Pareto (a, S)
b2(S) if there is no such y
.
Here gS(x) function indicates the maximum player 2 can get whenever player 1 gets at least x.
Axiom of Monotonicity: If (a, S2) and (a, S1) are bargaining pair such that b1(S1) = b2(S2) and
gS1 ≤ gS2 , then f2(a, S1) ≤ f2(a, S2) where (f(a, S) = f(a, S1) = f(a, S2))
25S is comprehensive iff y ∈ S whenever x ∈ S and x ≥ y ≥ 0. Let Σ be the class of compact
and comprehensive sets S ⊆ R2+ for which there is an x such that x 0. A utopia point αi(S) ≡
max{xi| (x1, x2) ∈ S}, i = 1, 2. Restricted Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: For all T, S ∈
Σ, is S ⊆ T F (T ) ∈ S and βα(S) = α(T ) for β ∈ R++ hold, then F (T ) = F (S)
26If S ⊆ T , αi(T ) = αi(S) and αj(T ) ≥ αj(S) then Fj(T ) ≥ Fj(S) for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j.
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methods until now. Let us survey the literature of Egalitarian bargaining solution.
Kalai (1977) [14] works on a n-person bargaining situations where bargainers may
encounter. An encounter is a situation described by two components. The first
component is the feasible outcome of cooperation and the second component is the
outcome of disagreement. He uses the axiomatic method as in Nash. He shows
that after the suitable normalization of the utilities, the players will maximize their
utilities with the restriction of equality, in other words they all gain “equally” in
the given situation. Myerson (1981) [20] investigates properties of social welfare
functions which are related to utilitarianism(favors maximal total welfare) and egal-
itarianism(favors maximal welfare constrained by individual members of the society
should enjoy equal benefits from the society). He proves two theorems. Theorem 1
shows that a linearity condition27 and Pareto optimality implies such social choice
funstions are utilitarian. For theorem 1 we suppose CP = CP 0. The second the-
orem indicates that concavity condition, regularity condition28, Pareto optimality
and Independence of irrelevant alternatives implies that a social choice function is
either utilitarian or egalitarian. The main purpose is to explain the role of these
two principals in the development of ethical theories and in practical social decision
making. Chun and Thomson (1990a) [6] describe the bargaining problem as a pair
of feasible set and disagreement point. Different from Nash, they assumed that only
the feasible set is known. Their aim is to evaluate a new solution method to the
bargaining problem of known feasible sets and uncertain disagreement points. They
propose the concavity of disagreement points to guarantee compromise among agents
before resolving the uncertainty regarding the disagreement point. They show that
disagreement point concavity together with weak Pareto optimality, independence
of non-individually rational points29 and continuity 30 is enough to characterize the
27For any finite collection of vectors {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ⊆ Rn, H(x1, x2, . . . , xn) be the com-
prehensive convex hull of (x1, x2, . . . , xn) which is the smallest convex and comprehensive set
containing the set (x1, x2, . . . , xn). Let CP be the set of choice problems to be studied,
choice problem is nonempty, closed, convex, and comprehensive subset of Rn and CP 0 :=
{H(x1, x2, . . . , xn)|(x1, x2, . . . , xn)isfinite}. Linearity Condition: A function F : CP → Rn is
linear iff F (λS + (1− λ)T ) = λF (S) + (1− λ)F (T )
28CP 0 ⊆ CP
29If S′ := {x′ ∈ Rn| ∃x ∈ S with d ≤ x and x′ ≤ x} then F (S′, d) = F (S, d)
30Let Σ be the class of all n-person problems. For all sequences {(Sv, dv)} in Σ, if Sv → S in the
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one parameter family of weighted Egalitarian solution.
Now we are going to survey the literature on Utilitarian Bargaining solution.
Thomson and Myerson (1980) [28] provides a strongly monotonic31 bargaining so-
lution. To achieve this characterization, first they provide intuitive axioms such as
cutting32), adding33, et cetera. Then they provide counterintuitive axioms which
they call “preserve” (preserve adding34, preserve cutting35, et cetera). Finally they
deduce that all these axioms are logical consequences of strong monotonicity. Hence
they provide a characterization of choice functions satisfying it. Thomson(1981) [30]
characterizes both the Nash solution and the utilitarian choice rules by replacing
independence of irrelevant axiom with Independence of irrelevant expensions on Σ′
36. Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (1994) [3] provide generalized Gini orderings
37 and on the agents’ utility gains which are quasi-concave, non-decreasing func-
tions, an linear in ranked subspaces of n dimensional Euclidean spaces. And They
characterize the generalized Gini class of bargaining solutions.
Hausdorff topology and dv = d for all v, then F (Sv, dv) = F (S, d)
31∀ S, T , if T ⊆ S, then f(S) = f(T ) or f(S) > f(T )
32Given S,T and player i, we say that Pi(S, T ) iff {x|xi ≤ fi(S)} ∩ S = {x|xi ≤ fi(S)} ∩ S
Cutting: ∀ S, T , if Pi(S, T ) and T ⊆ S then either fj(T ) > fj(S) ∀ j 6= i or (fj(T ) = fj(S) ∀ j 6= i
and fi(T ) ≤ fi(S)
33∀ S, T , if Pi(S, T ), S ⊆ T , and f(S) ∈ ∂S (Boundry set of S) then either fi(T ) > fi(S) or
(fi(T ) = fi(S) and fj(T ) ≤ fj(S) ∀ j 6= i )
34∀ S, T , if Pi(S, T ), S ⊆ T , and f(S) ∈ ∂S (Boundry set of S) then either fj(T ) > fj(S) ∀ j 6= i
or (fj(T ) = fj(S), ∀ j 6= i and fi(T ) ≤ fi(S) ∀ j 6= i )
35∀ S, T , if Pi(S, T ) and T ⊆ S then either fi(T ) > fi(S) or (fi(T ) = fi(S) and fi(T ) ≤
fi(S) ∀ j 6= i
36(4 := {p ∈ R2|‖p‖ = 1}, W (S, x) := {p ∈ 4|∀ y ∈ S, py ≤ px}.) ∀ S′ = (S, d) ∈ Σ′ with
x = f(S′), ∃pS′ ∈W (S, x) such that ∀T ′ = (T, d) ∈ Σ′ with (a) S ⊂ T and (b)pS′ ∈W (S, x), then
f(S′) = f(T ′)
37Let xr denote a rank-ordered permutation of x ∈ Rn such that xr1 ≥ xr2 ≥ . . . ≥ xrn. A
generalized Gini ordering is represented by a function gna : Rn → R such that gna (x) =
∑n
i=1 a
n
i x
r
i
∀x ∈ Rn, a = (an1 , .., ann) with 0 ≤ an1 ≤ an2 ≤ .. ≤ ann, ann > 0
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Coalition Formation
We can decompose the literature of cooperative bargaining and coalition forma-
tion into two distinct strands; one group supports the conventional wisdom, and the
other group claims that collective action does not have to be advantageous. Con-
ventional wisdom supports an intuitive claim: “Collectivism and centralization is
advantageous for employees and that the individualism of employees is more advan-
tageous for employers.” This controversial claim has been supported and opposed
by several author with different models. Some authors construct models that are
centered around substitute or complementary agents which will bargain with a firm
and there is a production process. At some other papers, the model is constructed
over bargaining between downstream and upstream firms.
The conventional wisdom states that size has a bargaining advantage. There are
several studies that support this claim. Galbraith (1952) [12] states that economies
give power to large corporations, and so they exploit this power. In this context,
countervailing power arises in the form of trade unions or civil organizations to reduce
the advantage of corporations. Scherer and Ross (1990, Chapter 14) [25] investigates
the structures of industries of US and abroad to focus on the motives for mergers
and their effects and supports the conventional wisdom.
There is a huge amount of work that opposes the conventional wisdom. Theoret-
ical analysis starts with Auman (1973) [2] who finds examples in which a monopoly
is not always at an advantage. He proves that in some cases the monopolist would
do well if he splits himself to many competing small traders. He provides an abstract
example such that the core is quite large and there is a unique competitive alloca-
tion and for the monopolist competitive allocation is the best in the core. Hence the
monopolist would do better if he split himself into many competing small traders.
Postlewaite and Rosenthal (1974) [23] investigate Auman’s (1973) [2] paper, and
ask the question “Can all the members of a coalition be in some sense worse off if
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they form a syndicate than if they don’t in an economically motivated setting ?”.
They give some examples to show that syndicate may disadvantageous. They also
construct an example to show that if agents are a set of individually small agents
relative to the market then Aumann’s phenomenon disappears. Legros (1987) [18]
works on bilateral markets with two complementary commodities. He shows that if
the two sides of the market are equal regarding the endowments then every syndi-
cate is strongly stable. Davidson (1988) [9] works on a wage determination model.
Consider a unionized oligopolistic industry with two different bargaining structures.
One is where the workers of each firm is represented by different unions and the
other is an industry wide union. In this context, Davidson investigates collective
bargaining in two different union types. He uses a noncooperative bargaining struc-
ture for contracts in oligopolistic industries. The result is that the industry wide
bargaining leads to higher wages. For multiple unions, if a firm offers a higher wage,
then its’ competitors will increase the employment of workers as a response. This
externality is internalized when an industry wide union forms. Stole and Zwiebel
(1996a) [27] works on within firm bargaining where employees and the firm faces
a wage bargaining. They consider a wide range of economic applications regarding
labor decisions, technological choice, and organizational design using a novel bar-
gaining methodology. In this context they investigate preference for unionization,
along with hiring and capital decisions, training and cross-training, the importance
of labor and asset specificity, managerial hierarchies. The results they find is that
desirability of a union for the employees’ point of view depends on the underlying
technology. If it is concave, then union is desirable for the employee. And the
reverse holds for a convex technology. Horn and Wolinski (1998) [13] works on a
bargaining process where there are two firms whose product is either substitutive or
complementary. There is a unique input for the firms and its price is determined
at the bargaining process with the supplier. There are two cases for upstream in-
dustry, a monopolistic supplier or separate suppliers for each firm. Main results of
these two upstream industry definitions are significantly different from the related
models where input prices are not determined in the bargaining process. For ex-
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ample, the profit of upstream firm is not necessarily maximized when the industry
is monopolized. In their paper, Chipty and Snyder (1999) [4] examine and con-
struct an abstract model of the cable television industry to explain why large buyers
may receive lower transfer prices from bargaining with suppliers (Downstream firms
bargaining with an upstream firm). They allow buyer merger and characterize all
buyer-supplier transactions as bilateral bargaining process. The suppliers bargain
simultaneously with each of the buyers separately, and the bargaining outcome is
the quantity to be traded and the tariff for the bundle which is characterized by the
Nash bargaining solution. They characterize the buyer merger effect over three cat-
egories: downstream efficiencies, upstream efficiencies, and bargaining effects. They
do not investigate over all alternative mechanisms through which buyer size can af-
fect market outcomes. Segal (2003) [26] examines the profitability of integrations
in a cooperative game solved by a random-order value38 and shows that if the com-
plementarity of the colluding players is reduced by other players then collusion is
profitable. The same logic yields for unprofitability whenever complementarity is
increased. Segal also shows that different types of integration have different bar-
gaining effects. Atakan(2008) [1] search for the conditions over economic agents that
will cause to bargain collectively instead of individually with a principal. Previous
work imposed exogenously determined bargaining sequences and the result is the
common intuition (substitutability cause collectivism). Atakan imposes an endoge-
nously determined bargaining sequence. The results show that the previous work is
not robust for substitute agents. For example, sufficiently patient heterogeneous39
substitute agents40 prefer individual bargaining to collective bargaining.
38For each player i ∈ N , [∆iv](S) = v(S ∪ i) − v(S \ i) for all S ⊂ N . Let Π denote the set of
orderings of N. Let pi(i) denote the rank of player i ∈ N in ordering pi ∈ Π, pii := {j ∈ N |pi(j) ≤
pi(i)}. Let P (Π) := {α ∈ RΠ+|
∑
pi∈Π αpi = 1} denote the set of probability distrubitions over Π. For
each α ∈ P (Π), ∃ a random value order fα(v) such that for each i ∈ N fαi (v) :=
∑
pi∈Π αpi∆iv(pi
i)
39Consider a production process. There exists a principal and agents. Each agent is an input for
the production, they bargain with the principal about the wage. If agent i is employed, then his
contribution to the production is vi. Hence after the employment of agent i, if principal hire agent
j then his contribution to the production is 1− vi. Let v = v1 and d = v − v2, here d denotes the
degree of heterogeneity. If d=0 then then the agents are homogeneous.
40If v1 ≥ 1 − v2 then the agents are substitute agents. If v1 ≤ 1 − v2 then the agents are
complements.
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To sum up, we have discussed the literature review of cooperative bargaining and
coalition formation. We observe that the studies focus on production processes or
wage determinations. They all are private goods. In this thesis, we are going to
focus on pure public good bargaining situations.
We are going to define two different model; representative coalition model and
non-representative coalition model. In representative coalition model, there is a
single coalition which has the power to dictate its agreement with the principal to
all agents. Every agent decides whether to be a member of the coalition or not. Even
if an agent is not a member of that coalition, the bargaining outcome of that coalition
also binds the agent. Hence the bargaining outcome is non-excludable and non-rival.
Therefore, the bargaining outcome is a pure public good. In non-representative
coalition model, there is a single coalition and bargaining outcome binds only the
members of the coalition. Agents who prefers not to join the coalition, individually
bargains with the principal and receives the corresponding outcome. Again for agents
who bargain as a coalition, the bargaining outcome is non-excludable and non-rival.
Hence, the bargaining outcome is a pure public good. Therefore, we are going to
focus on pure public good bargaining situations.
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Chapter 3
Model
There exists a principal with single peaked preferences. Let p0 = 0 be the peak of
the principal. Let N:={1,2,. . . ,n} be the set of agents. Each agent has symmetric
single peaked preferences. For each i ∈ N , pi ∈ [0, 1] is the peak of agent i. Let d be
the disagreement point. Assume that for all i ∈ N and for all x ∈ R, ui(x) ≥ ui(d)
. The Euclidean utility function of each agent is:
ui : R∪ {d} → R such that ui(x) = −|x− pi| ∀x ∈ R ∪ {d} and ∀i ∈ N .
The set of all utility functions is U := {−|x− pi| | pi ∈ [0, 1]}. Note that there exists
a one-to-one correspondence between ui and pi. Thus whenever there is no risk of
confusion, we will use ui and pi interchangeably.
I have defined the preferences of the society. Now I will define a choice rule which
will give us the answer to the question: “How would a society decide on a cooperative
action?”. Therefore we need a function that will show us how a coalition of agents
aggregate their preferences. We are talking about a choice rule which will take the
utilities of the agent as variables and produce a representative utility.
Definition 1. A social welfare function is;
φ :=
⋃
S∈P (N)
U |S| → U
1
We can provide some social welfare function examples;
i) Mean of the coalitions is φ(uS) =
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
pi
ii) Median of the coalitions is φ(uS) =
 (
|S|+1
2
)′th peak if |S| is odd
(
|S|
2
′
th peak+
|S|+1
2
′
th peak
2
) if |S| is even
Both rules are Pareto efficient (check definition 7) and population monotonic
(check definition 9). We can check the properties of these social welfare functions
from Table 5.1, presented in Chapter 5.
Now I will define a rule that will show us how a coalition bargains with the
principal. This bargaining rule will take the principal’s utility and representative
utility as variables.
Definition 2. A bargaining rule is a function of two variables,
µ := U2 → R∪ {d}
Let’s give some bargaining rule examples;
i) µ(p0, φ(pS)) :=
(p0+φ(pS))
n
, (n ≥ 0).
ii) µ(p0, φ(pS)) :=

p0 + φ(pS) if φ(pS) < 0.4
φ(pS)/2 if 0.6 6= φ(pS) ≥ 0.4
(φ(pS) + 2)/2 if φ(pS) = 0.6
The bargaining rule µ(p0, φ(pS)) :=
(p0+φ(pS))
n
produce bargaining outcomes be-
tween p0 = 0 and φ(pS). Hence it is Pareto efficient (check definition 8). This
bargaining rule is also preference monotonic (check definition 11). The second bar-
gaining rule particularly designed for not satisfying preference monotonicity. We can
check the properties of these bargaining rules from Table 5.2, presented in Chapter
5.
We will analyze the implications of two alternative assumptions regarding the
coalition formation process and representativeness of a coalition. They are detailed
2
below:
(i) Representative coalition
There is a single coalition which has the power to dictate its agreement with the
principal to all agents. In this process every agent decides whether to be a member
of the coalition or not. This is the only coalition that forms. The formed coalition
then bargains with the principal. The bargaining outcome is binding for all agents,
independent of whether they decided to join the coalition or not in the first place.
Definition 3. A stable representative coalition S is such that any member of the
coalition will not be better off by leaving the coalition and any agent outside the
coalition will not be better off by joining the coalition. S ⊆ N is a stable coali-
tion if and only if ui(µ(u0, φ(uS))) ≥ ui(µ(u0, φ(uS\{i}))) and uj(µ(u0, φ(uS∪{j}))) ≤
uj(µ(u0, φ(uS))) for all i ∈ S and for all j ∈ N \ S.
(ii) Non-Representative coalition
While as in the previous item, only a single coalition can form, this coalition is
not a representation of the agents who prefers not to join it. Instead each such agent
individually bargains with the principal and recieves the corresponding outcome.
The coalition formation process is similar to the previous item; each agent declares
whether she wants to be a member of the coalition or not. The important difference
is that, now, an agent who chooses not to join the coalition bargains for himself
(rather than being represented by the coalition as in the previous case).
Definition 4. A stable non-representative coalition S is such that any member of
the coalition will not be better off by leaving the coalition and any agent outside
the coalition will not be better off by joining the coalition. S ⊆ N is a stable
coalition if and only if ui(µ(u0, φ(uS))) ≥ ui(µ(u0, φ(u{i}))) and uj(µ(u0, φ(uj))) ≥
uj(µ(u0, φ(uS∪{j}))) for all i ∈ S and for all j ∈ N \ S.
3
Definition 5. A coalition S ∈ P(N) is connected; if there exists i, j ∈ S such that
pi ≤ pk ≤ pj then k ∈ S.
Suppose we locate alternatives along a one-dimensional political spectrum. It is
certain that voters with single peaked preferences choose alternatives closest to their
most preferred outcome. Since political parties construct their policies in order to get
the maximum amount of vote at the corresponding political spectrum, the Downsian
model suggests that policies will converge to the position of the median voter, and
agents who vote for the same party construct connected coalitions. In other words,
party policies will be dependent to the distribution of voters, and coalitions will be
connected at the Downsian axis. We can provide an example. Consider a normal
distribution of voters with mean 1/2 on a [0,1] Downsian axis. Suppose there are
only two political parties on 0 and 1, such as a communist party and a liberal party.
In order to win the elections, one of them should get more votes then the other party.
To achieve this goal, they will change their party policies. And trivially they will
converge to the mean of the distribution which is 1/2. In other words, these two
parties will look alike after a while. In this paper, we suggest a similar downsion axis.
Agents with single peaked preferences have preferences on [0,1] interval. Different
from the Downsian model we propose a second stage to the choice process which
is the bargaining with a principal. Here an important question rises: “Will we still
observe connected coalitions?”.
We are going to impose two major definitions; Pareto efficiency and monotonicity
with respect to our models. Both definitions are standard in bargaining literature.
Definition 6. An agreement x ∈ [0, 1] is Pareto efficient with respect to S and uS if
for all y 6= x there exists i ∈ S such that ui(x) > ui(y)
Pareto efficiency definition is applicable to both bargaining and social welfare
functions.
Definition 7. A social welfare function φ is Pareto efficient iff φ(uS) is Pareto
efficent with respect to for all S ⊆ N , for all uS.
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Definition 8. A bargaining rule µ is Pareto efficient iff µ(u0, φ(uS)) is Pareto effi-
cient with respect to for all S ⊆ N , for all φ(uS).
Now, I am going to define two different types of monotonicity. Since social
welfare function and bargaining rule possess different properties, we need different
monotonicity definitions. Population monotonicity is defined for social welfare func-
tion. If an agent decides to join a coalition S whenever social welfare function is
population monotonic, then agent is better of by joining the coalition S.
Definition 9. A social welfare function φ is population monotonic, if for all S ⊆ N ,
for all uS, for all i 6∈ S and for all ui ∈ U we have ui(φ(uS)) ≤ ui(φ(uS∪{i}))
A social welfare function φ is strictly population monotonic, if for all S ⊆ N , for
all uS, for all i 6∈ S and for all ui ∈ U we have ui(φ(uS)) < ui(φ(uS∪{i})) whenever
φ(uS) 6= pi and ui(φ(uS)) = ui(φ(uS∪{i})) whenever φ(uS) = pi.
Population monotonicity is applicable to bargaining rule. But assuming this
property on a bargaining rule give us triviality. If an agent will be better of by
joining the coalition, then trivially she will join the coalition. Hence we need other
means of definition for the montonicity of bargaining rule. Preference monotonicity
is a standard monotonicity definition which aims to preserve order.
Definition 10. A social welfare function φ is preference monotonic, if for all S ⊆ N ,
for all uS, for all i ∈ S, for all u′i such that pi < p′i we have φ(uS) ≤ φ((uS−i, u′i)).
Definition 11. A bargaining rule µ is preference monotonic if pi ≤ pj implies
µ(u0, ui) ≤ µ(u0, uj) for all i, j ∈ N , and for all ui, uj.
A bargaining rule µ is strictly preference monotonic if pi < pj implies µ(u0, ui) <
µ(u0, uj) and pi = pj implies µ(u0, ui) = µ(u0, uj) for all i, j ∈ N .
The next property, socially boundedness is defining a relation between social
welfare function and bargaining rule. This property limits bargaining rule shifts
with social welfare function shifts.
Definition 12. A bargaining rule µ is called socially bounded by φ with respect to
S and uS if and only if there exists i ∈ N \ S and ui ∈ U such that |µ(p0, φ(uS)) −
µ(p0, φ(uS∪{i}))| ≤ |φ(uS)− φ(uS∪{i})|.
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Chapter 4
Results
4.0.1 Representative Coalition
As we mentioned at the Chapter 3, representative coalition is the baseline model.
There is a single coalition which has the power to dictate its’ agreement with the
principal to all agents. In this process every agent decides whether to be a member
of the coalition or not. Stable coalition S is a coalition such that any member of
the coalition will not be better off by leaving the coalition and any agent outside
the coalition will not be better off by joining the coalition. I should point out that,
each agent can observe only the results of the actions of one step forward. If an
agent prefers to leave the coalition, then the agent will know the outcomes of the
bargaining processes when she is inside and outside the coalition.
I will start with a lemma that shows us the Pareto efficient bargaining rules with
respect to preferences of the agents’.
Lemma 1. A bargaining rule µ is Pareto efficient if and only if ∀S ⊆ P(N) and
∀uS, min{p0, φ(uS)} ≤ µ((u0, uS)) ≤ max{p0, φ(uS)} where p0 = 0
Proof. (⇒) Assume that a bargaining rule µ is Pareto efficient. I will show that
∀S and ∀uS min{p0, φ(uS)} ≤ µ(u0, uS) ≤ max{p0, φ(uS)}. Assume not, assume
that ∃ S1 ⊂ P(N) and ∃uS1 such that µ((u0, uS1)) 6∈ [min{p0, φ(uS1)},max{p0, φ(u1)}].
Without loss of generality, suppose µ(u0, uS1) > max{p0, φ(uS1)}.
6
0
p0 φ(uS1) µ(u0, uS1)
1
It is certain that ∀y ∈ [p0, µ(u0, uS1)) u0(y) > u0(µ(u0, uS1)) and uS1(y) > uS1(µ(u0, uS1)).
But this contradicts with the fact that µ is Pareto efficient .
(⇐) Consider a bargaining rule µ such that ∀u0 and ∀S , min{p0, φ(uS)} ≤
µ((u0, uS)) ≤ max{p0, φ(uS)}. I will show that µ is Pareto efficient. Since ∀x 6=
µ((u0, uS)) implies u0(µ(u0, uS)) > u0(x) or uS(µ(u0, uS)) > uS(x) , µ is Pareto
efficient with respect to ∀S and ∀uS.
We can observe by Lemma 1 that in one dimensional policy spectrum Pareto
efficient points of two agents is the points between the peaks of the agents’.
Lemma 1 is related with bargaining rules, and we can impose the same logic to
social welfare functions.
Corollary 1. A social welfare function is Pareto efficient iff its range is a subset of
[pmin(S), pmax(S)] where pmin(S) and pmax(S) stands for minimum and maximum peaks
of the agents’ which are members of the coalition S.
Proof. By lemma 1
Theorem 1 will show us under specific circumstances there exist agents who will
join the coalition.
Theorem 1. Let µ be a preference monotonic, Pareto efficient bargaining rule and
let φ be a population monotonic social welfare function. If ∃S ⊆ N , uS ∈ U |S| and
∃i ∈ N \ S, ui ∈ U such that φ(uS) < pi then agent i will be better off or indifferent
by joining the coalition.
Proof. Suppose ∃S ⊆ N , uS ∈ U |S| and ∃i ∈ N \ S, ui ∈ U such that φ(uS) < pj.
Without loss of generality, consider this is the case;
0
p0 φ(uS) pj
1
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Since φ is population monotonic, φ(uS∪{j}) ∈ [φ(uS), φ(uS) + 2a] where a := |pj −
φ(uS)|.
0
p0 φ(uS) pj φ(uS) + 2a
1
Since µ is Pareto efficient, by lemma 1min{p0, φ(uS)} ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS)) ≤ max{p0, φ(uS)}
for all S and for all uS. Since µ is preference monotonic , µ(u0, φ(uS)) ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS∪{j})).
Since 0 = p0 ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS)) ≤ φ(uS) and µ(u0, φ(uS)) ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS∪{j})) for all S
and φ(uS∪{j}) ∈ [φ(uS), φ(uS) + 2a], uj(µ(u0, φ(uS))) ≤ uj(µ(u0, φ(uS∪{j}))). There-
fore agent j will be better off or indifferent by join the coalition.
In the following example, we will construct a social welfare function that satisfies
all assumptions of theorem 1 except population monotonicity. We show that for the
rule, the conclusion of Theorem 1 fail. Hence agent 2 does not join the coalition {1}.
Example 1. Consider the case;
0
p0
0.5
p1
1
p2
Let p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1. Suppose that the social welfare function is
φ(uS) =

0.4 if |N | = 2, S = {1}, p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1
0.3 if |N | = 2, S = {1, 2}, p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1
0.2 if |N | = 2, S = {2}, p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1
1
|S| ·
∑
i∈S
pi otherwise
, and the bargaining rule is µ(u0, φ(uS)) =
φ(S) + p0
2
.
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and bargaining outcomes:
if S = {1, 2} then φ(uS) = 0.4, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.2
if S = {1} then φ(uS) = 0.3, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.15
if S = {2} then φ(uS) = 0.2, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.1
• S = {1, 2} is not stable because agent 2 will leave the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.15 to 0.2 which is closer to agent 2’s peak.
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• S = {2} is not stable because agent 1 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0.1 to 0.15 which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
Hence {1} is the stable coalition.
In the following example, we will construct a bargaining rule that satisfies all
assumptions of theorem 1 except preference monotonicity. We show that for the
rule, the conclusion of Theorem 1 fail. Hence agent 2 does not join the coalition {1}.
Example 2. Consider the case;
0
p0
0.5
p1
1
p2
Let p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1. Suppose that social welfare function is φ(uS) =
1
|S| ·
∑
i∈S
pi,
and the bargaining rule is
µ(p0, φ(pS)) :=
 φ(pS) if φ(pS) = 0.5φ(pS)/10 otherwise
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and bargaining outcomes:
if S = {1, 2} then φ(uS) = 0.75, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.075
if S = {1} then φ(uS) = 0.5, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.5
if S = {2} then φ(uS) = 1, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.1
• S = {1, 2} is not stable because agent 2 will leave the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.075 to 0.5 which is closer to agent 2’s peak.
{1} and {2} are stable coalitions.
In the following example, we will construct a bargaining rule that satisfies all
assumptions of theorem 1 except Pareto efficiency. We show that for the rule, the
conclusion of Theorem 1 fail. Hence agent 2 does not join the coalition {1}.
Example 3. Consider the case;
0
p0
0.5
p1
1
p2
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Let p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1. Suppose that social welfare function is φ(uS) =
1
|S| ·
∑
i∈S
pi,
and the bargaining rule is µ(u0, φ(uS)) =
φ(S) + p0
2
+ 1.
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and bargaining outcomes:
if S = {1, 2} then φ(uS) = 0.75, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 1.375
if S = {1} then φ(uS) = 0.5, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 1.25
if S = {2} then φ(uS) = 1, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 1.5
• S = {1, 2} is not stable because agent 2 will leave the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 1.375 to 1.25 which is closer to agent 2’s peak.
• S = {2} is not stable because agent 1 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 1.5 to 1.25 which is closer to agent 2’s peak.
Hence {1} is the stable coalitions.
In the following example, we will construct a bargaining rule that satisfies all
assumptions of theorem 1 except φ(uS) ≤ pi. We show that for the rule, the con-
clusion of Theorem 1 fail. We observe that φ(u{2}) > p1, and agent 1 does not join
the coalition whenever the social welfare function is population monotonic and the
bargaining rule is preference monotonic and Pareto efficient.
Example 4. Consider the case;
0
p0
0.5
p1
1
p2
Let p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1. Suppose that social welfare function is φ(uS) =
1
|S| ·
∑
i∈S
pi,
and the bargaining rule is µ(u0, φ(uS)) =
φ(S) + p0
2
.
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and bargaining outcomes:
if S = {1, 2} then φ(uS) = 0.75, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.375
if S = {1} then φ(uS) = 0.5, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.25
if S = {2} then φ(uS) = 1, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.5
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• S = {1, 2} is not stable because agent 1 will leave the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.375 to 0.5 which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
• S = {1} is not stable because agent 2 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0.25 to 0.375 which is closer to agent 2’s peak.
Hence {2} is the stable coalitions.
? Examples 1-2-3-4 together show the necessity of the assumptions of Theorem 1.
These examples also show that the assumptions of theorem 1 does not imply each
other.
Now I will provide some corollaries to Theorem 1. The first one provides a
case that we always reach a connected coalition whenever |N | = 3. Since we are
interested in connected coalitions especially grand coalition in this thesis, corollary
2 is an important case.
Corollary 2. If the bargaining rule µ is strictly preference monotonic and Pareto
efficient and the social welfare function φ is strictly population monotonic, not Pareto
efficient and N = {1, 2, 3} such that φ(u{1,3}) < p2 then any stable coalition will be
connected.
Proof. By Theorem 1, agent 2 will be better of by joining the coalition {1, 3}. Since
{1, 3} is the only unconnected coalition type, any stable coalition will be connected.
The next corollary provides a case that we always reach a grand coalition. But
the assumptions are strong.
Corollary 3. If the bargaining rule µ is strictly preference monotonic, Pareto effi-
cient, and the social welfare function φ is strictly population monotonic, not Pareto
efficient and φ(uN−{i}) < pi for any i ∈ N then N will be the unique stable coalition.
Proof. Assume that for any i ∈ N , φ(uN−{i}) < pi. Since µ is strictly preference
monotonic, Pareto efficient and φ is strictly population monotonic, Theorem 1 sat-
isfies. And from Theorem 1 , any agent who satisfies φ(uN−{i}) < pi will join the
11
coalition. Since each agent in N satisfies this property, it is clear that N will be the
unique stable coalition.
Theorem 1 provides an intuition to search for agents’ peaks greater then social
choice outcome of a coalition which they are not part of it. First of all, we need
to impose the assumptions of theorem 1 on social welfare function and bargaining
rule. But these assumptions will not be enough. We are going to impose also Pareto
efficiency of social welfare function. Because without Pareto efficieny, social choice
outcomes does not have to be inside the interval [pmin(S), pmax(S)], so we may not find
an agent peak which is greater then social choice outcome.
Proposition 1. If the bargaining rule µ is preference monotonic, Pareto efficient
and the social choice rule φ is population monotonic, Pareto efficient then the agent
with the largest peak will be a member of the stable coalition.
Proof. Let S ⊆ N be any coalition and pn = max{pi| i ∈ N} and pmin = min{pi| i ∈
N}. Since φ is Pareto efficient and population monotonic, pmin ≤ φ(uS) ≤ φ(uS∪{n}) ≤
pmax. Since µ is Pareto efficient and preference monotonic, 0 = p0 ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS)) ≤
µ(u0, uS∪{n}) ≤ φ(uS∪{n}) ≤ pmax. Hence agent n will be better off or indifferent by
join the coalition. I am done.
By imposing Pareto efficieny to social welfare function, we deduce a nice result.
This also shows the importance of Pareto efficiency.
In the following example, we observe that agent 3 will join any coalition S when-
ever φ(uS) < p3 such that 3 6∈ S. For this example, we observe an ambiguity.
Consider the inequality: φ(u{3}) = 0.3 > 0.1 = p1, despite this inequality agent 1
prefers to join the coalition. Since Theorem 1 is not an ’if and only if’ statement,
we can not suppose any action regarding agent 1. Now lets provide another example
to reveal the ambiguity: “What will be the action of agent i if φ(u{S}) > pi for all S
such that i is not an element of S?”.
Example 5. Consider the case;
0
p0
0.1
p1
0.2
p2
0.3
p3
1
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Let p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.2 and p3 = 0.3. Suppose that social welfare function is the mean
of the peaks that is for all S, φ(uS) =
1
|S| ·
∑
i∈S
pi, and the bargaining rule is
µ(u0, φ(uS)) =
φ(S) + p0
2
.
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and bargaining outcomes:
if S = {1, 2, 3} then φ(uS) = 0.2, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.1
if S = {1, 3} then φ(uS) = 0.2, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.1
if S = {2, 3} then φ(uS) = 0.25, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.125
if S = {1, 2} then φ(uS) = 0.15, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.075
if S = {1} then φ(uS) = 0.1, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.05
if S = {2} then φ(uS) = 0.2, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.1
if S = {3} then φ(uS) = 0.3, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.15
• S = {1, 2} is not stable because φ(u{1,2}) = 0.15 < 0.3 = p3 which means agent
3 will join the coalition to move the bargaining outcome from 0.075 to 1 which
is closer to agent 3’s peak.
• S = {1} is not stable because φ(u{1}) = 0.1 < 0.3 = p3 which means agent 3
will join the coalition to move the bargaining outcome from 0.05 to 0.1 which
is closer to agent 3’s peaks.
• S = {2} is not stable because φ(u{2}) = 0.2 < 0.3 = p3 which means agent 3
will join the coalition to move the bargaining outcome from 0.1 to 0.125 which
is closer to agent 3’s peak.
• S = {3} is not stable because agent 1 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0.15 to 0.1 which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
Hence there are two stable coalitions which are {1, 2, 3} and {1, 3}.
In the following example, we observe that φ(u{3}) = 1 > 0.6 = p1 and agent 1
prefers not to join the coalition {3}.
Example 6. Consider the case;
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0
p0
0.6
p1
0.8
p2
1
p3
Let p1 = 0.6, p2 = 0.8 and p3 = 1. Suppose that social welfare function is the mean
of the peaks which means for all S, φ(uS) =
1
|S| ·
∑
i∈S
pi, and the bargaining rule is
µ(u0, φ(uS)) =
φ(S) + p0
2
.
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and bargaining outcomes:
if S = {1, 2, 3} then φ(uS) = 0.8, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.4
if S = {1, 3} then φ(uS) = 0.8, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.4
if S = {2, 3} then φ(uS) = 0.9, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.45
if S = {1, 2} then φ(uS) = 0.7, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.35
if S = {1} then φ(uS) = 0.6, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.3
if S = {2} then φ(uS) = 0.8, µ(u0, φ((p2))) = 0.4
if S = {3} then φ(uS) = 1, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.5
• S = {1, 2, 3} is not stable because agent 1 will leave the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.4 to 0.45 which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
• S = {2, 3} is not stable because agent 2 will leave the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.45 to 0.5 which is closer to agent 2’s peaks.
• S = {1, 3} is not stable because agent 1 will leave the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0,4 to 0,5 which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
• S = {2} is not stable because agent 3 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0,4 to 0,45 which is closer to agent 3’s peak.
• S = {1} is not stable because agent 2 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0,3 to 0,435 which is closer to agent 2’s peak.
Hence the only stable coalition is {3}.
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? Examples 5-6 together show that theorem 1 assumptions are not enough to
predict the action of agent i whenever φ(u{S}) ≥ pi for any S ⊆ N and for any
i ∈ N \ S.
The next lemma will be necessary to prove Theorem 2. The lemma is about
the movement of location of the social choice outcome whenever an agent enters a
coalition.
Lemma 2. If pi ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS)) and |µ(u0, φ(uS)) − pi| ≥ |φ(uS) − φ(uS∪{i})| for
some S ⊆ N and i ∈ N \S, and µ is Pareto efficient and φ is population monotonic
then pi ≤ φ(uS∪{i}) ≤ φ(uS)
Proof. Suppose there exists S ⊆ N and i ∈ N \ S such that pi ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS)) and
|µ(u0, φ(uS)) − pi| ≥ |φ(uS) − φ(uS∪{i})|. And suppose also µ is Pareto efficient
and φ is population monotonic. I will show that pi ≤ φ(uS∪{i}) ≤ φ(uS). Since
there exists S ⊆ N and i ∈ N \ S such that pi ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS)) and µ is Pareto
efficient, pi ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS)) ≤ φ(uS). Since φ is population monotonic, φ(uS∪{i}) ∈
[φ(uS), φ(uS) + 2a] where a = |pi − φ(uS)|.
p0
(pi + a) = (φ(uS) + 2a)
pi µ(u0, φ(uS)) φ(uS)
Since we have S ⊆ N and i ∈ N \ S such that |µ(u0, φ(uS)) − pi| ≥ |φ(uS) −
φ(uS∪{i})| and φ(uS∪{i}) ∈ [φ(uS), φ(uS)+2a] where a = |pi−φ(uS)|, pi ≤ φ(uS∪{i}) ≤
φ(uS).
So far, we have discussed the action of agent i whenever φ(u{S}) < pi for any
S ⊆ N and for any i ∈ N\S. We showed that if the bargaining rule is Pareto efficient,
preference monotonic, and the social welfare function is population monotonic, and
φ(u{S}) < pi for S ⊆ N , i ∈ N \ S then agent i joins the coalition S. Now we are
interested in the action agent i whenever φ(u{S}) ≥ pi for any S ⊆ N and for any
i ∈ N \ S. By examples 5-6, we know that the assumptions of theorem 1 will not be
enough to classify the action of agent i whenever φ(u{S}) ≥ pi for any S ⊆ N and
for any i ∈ N \ S.
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Theorem 2. Let µ be preference monotonic, Pareto efficient, and let φ population
monotonic. If ∃S ⊆ N , uS ∈ U |S| and ∃i ∈ N \ S, ui ∈ U such that µ is socially
bounded by φ, µ(p0, φ(uS)) ≥ pi, and |µ(p0, φ(uS)) − pi| ≥ |φ(uS) − φ(uS∪{i})| then
ui(µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))) ≥ ui(µ(u0, φ(uS))).
Proof. Suppose that there exist a coalition S ⊆ N , with uS ∈ U |S| and an agent
i ∈ N − S with ui ∈ U such that µ is socially bounded by φ, µ(p0, φ(uS)) ≥ pi,
and |µ(p0, φ(uS)) − pi| ≥ |φ(uS) − φ(uS∪{i})|. Since µ is Pareto efficient, φ(uS) ≥
µ(p0, φ(uS)).
(Case 1) pi < µ(u0, φ(uS)) = φ(uS)
0
p0 pi µ(u0, φ(uS)) = φ(uS)
1
Since there exists S ⊆ N and i ∈ N \ S such that pi ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS)) and
|µ(u0, φ(uS)) − pi| ≥ |φ(uS) − φ(uS∪{i})| and µ is Pareto efficient and φ is popu-
lation monotonic, pi ≤ φ(uS∪{i}) ≤ φ(uS) by Lemma 2. Now we are going to check
all possible locations of φ(uS∪{i}) by cases;
(Subcase 1.1) φ(uS∪{i}) = φ(uS)
0
p0 pi
φ(uS∪{i})
µ(u0, φ(uS)) = φ(uS)
1
It is trivial that |φ(uS∪{i}) − φ(uS)| = 0. Since µ is socially bounded by φ,
0 = |φ(uS∪{i})−φ(uS)| ≥ |µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))−µ(u0, φ(uS))|. Hence |µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))−
µ(u0, φ(uS))| = 0, so µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) = µ(u0, φ(uS)) which means ui(µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))) =
ui(µ(u0, φ(uS))). Therefore agent i is indifferent of being inside or outside the coali-
tion, so I am done.
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(Subcase 1.2) pi < φ(uS∪{i}) < φ(uS)
0
p0 pi
φ(uS∪{i})
µ(u0, φ(uS)) = φ(uS)
1
Now we have pi < φ(uS∪{i}) < φ(uS) = µ(u0, φ(uS)). Since µ is socially bounded
by φ and Pareto efficient, φ(uS∪{i}) = µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})). Hence pi < φ(uS∪{i}) =
µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) < φ(uS) = µ(uS). Therefore agent i will join the coalition S.
(Subcase 1.3) pi = φ(uS∪{i}) < φ(uS)
0
p0
φ(uS∪{i})
pi µ(u0, φ(uS)) = φ(uS)
1
Since µ is socially bounded by φ and Pareto efficient, pi = φ(uS∪{i}) = µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) <
φ(uS) = µ(uS). Hence agent i will join the coalition.
(Case 2) pi < µ(u0, φ(uS)) < φ(uS)
0
p0 pi
µ(u0, φ(uS))
φ(uS)
1
Since there exists S ⊆ N and i ∈ N \ S such that pi ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS)) and
|µ(u0, φ(uS)) − pi| ≥ |φ(uS) − φ(uS∪{i})| and µ is Pareto efficient and φ is popu-
lation monotonic, pi ≤ φ(uS∪{i}) ≤ φ(uS) by Lemma 2. Again we are going to check
all possible locations of φ(uS∪{i}) by cases;
(Subcase 2.1) φ(uS∪{i}) = φ(uS)
0
p0 pi
µ(u0, φ(uS))
φ(uS∪{i}) =φ(uS)
1
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We have pi < µ(u0, φ(uS)) < φ(uS) = φ(uS∪{i}). Since µ is socially bounded
by φ and 0 = |φ(uS) − φ(uS∪{i})|, |µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) − µ(u0, φ(uS))| = 0. Hence
ui(µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))) = ui(µ(u0, φ(uS))), so agent i is indifferent of being inside or
outside the coalition. I am done.
(Subcase 2.2) pi < µ(u0, φ(uS)) < φ(uS∪{i}) < φ(uS)
0
p0 pi
µ(u0, φ(uS))
φ(uS∪{i}) φ(uS)
1
Recall the assumption |µ(p0, φ(uS))−pi| ≥ |φ(uS)−φ(uS∪{i})|. Since µ is socially
bounded by φ, |φ(uS)−φ(uS∪{i})| ≥ |µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))−µ(u0, φ(uS))|. Hence we have
|µ(p0, φ(uS)) − pi| ≥ |µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) − µ(u0, φ(uS))|. Since µ is preference mono-
tonic and φ(uS∪{i}) < φ(uS) and |µ(p0, φ(uS))−pi| ≥ |µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))−µ(u0, φ(uS))|,
pi ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS)). Agent i will be better off or indifferent by join-
ing the coalition.
(Subcase 2.3) pi < µ(u0, φ(uS)) = φ(uS∪{i}) < φ(uS)
0
p0 pi
µ(u0, φ(uS))
φ(uS∪{i}) φ(uS)
1
Recall the assumption |µ(p0, φ(uS)) − pi| ≥ |φ(uS) − φ(uS∪{i})|. Since µ is so-
cially bounded by φ and |µ(p0, φ(uS))−pi| ≥ |φ(uS)−φ(uS∪{i})|, |µ(p0, φ(uS))−pi| ≥
|µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) − µ(u0, φ(uS))|. Since µ is preference monotonic and φ(uS∪{i}) <
φ(uS) and |µ(p0, φ(uS))−pi| ≥ |µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))−µ(u0, φ(uS))|, pi ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) ≤
µ(u0, φ(uS)). Agent i will be better off or indifferent by joining the coalition.
(Subcase 2.4) pi < φ(uS∪{i}) < µ(u0, φ(uS)) < φ(uS)
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0
p0 pi φ(uS∪{i})
µ(u0, φ(uS))
φ(uS)
1
Lets call a := |φ(uS∪{i})−pi|, b := |φ(uS∪{i})−µ(u0, φ(uS))|, and c := |µ(u0, φ(uS))−
φ(uS)|.
So |µ(u0, φ(uS))−pi| = a+b and |φ(uS∪{i})−φ(uS)| = b+c. Since |µ(u0, φ(uS))−pi| ≥
|φ(uS∪{i}) − φ(uS)|, a + b ≥ b + c which implies a ≥ c. Since µ is Pareto ef-
ficient, µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) ≤ φ(uS∪{i}). So we reach µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) ≤ φ(uS∪{i}) <
µ(u0, φ(uS)) < φ(uS), lets call d := |µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))−φ(uS∪{i})|. From social bound-
edness we know that:
d + b = |µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) − µ(u0, φ(uS))| ≤ |φ(uS∪{i}) − φ(uS)| = b + c, which gives
us c ≥ d and we showed that a ≥ c so by transitivity a ≥ d which means a :=
|φ(uS∪{i}) − p2| ≥ d := |µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) − φ(uS∪{i})|. Hence pi ≤ µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) ≤
φ(uS∪{i}) and ui(µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))) ≥ ui(µ0, φ(uS))). Hence agent i will be better off
or indifferent by joining the coalition.
(Subcase 2.5) pi = φ(uS∪{i}) < µ(u0, φ(uS)) < φ(uS)
0
p0 pi=φ(uS∪{i})
µ(u0, φ(uS))
φ(uS)
1
Since |µ(p0, φ(uS)) − pi| ≥ |φ(uS) − φ(uS∪{i})| by assumption and |µ(u0, uS) −
φ(uS)| > 0, there will be no such a case.
(Case 3) pi = µ(u0, φ(uS)) < φ(uS)
0
p0 pi=µ(u0, φ(uS)) φ(uS)
1
From the assumption we know that |µ(p0, φ(uS))−pi| ≥ |φ(uS)−φ(uS∪{i})|. Hence
0 = |µ(p0, φ(uS))−pi| ≥ |φ(uS)−φ(uS∪{i})|. So we have 0 = |φ(uS)−φ(uS∪{i})|. Since
µ is socially bounded by φ, |µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))−µ(u0, φ(uS))| ≤ |φ(uS∪{i})−φ(uS)| = 0.
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So |µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))− µ(u0, φ(uS))| = 0. Hence pi = µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) = µ(u0, φ(uS)).
Agent i is indifferent of being inside or outside the coalition.
(Case 4) pi = µ(u0, φ(uS)) = φ(uS)
0
p0
φ(uS)
pi=µ(u0, φ(uS))
1
Since φ is population monotonic, φ(uS∪{i}) = φ(uS). Since µ is socially bounded
by φ, 0 = |φ(uS∪{i}) − φ(uS)| ≥ |µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i})) − µ(u0, φ(uS))| = 0. Agent i is
indifferent of being inside or outside the coalition.
By cases 1-4, we have completed the proof.
In the following example, we will construct a bargaining rule and a social wel-
fare function that satisfies all assumptions of theorem 2 except Pareto efficiency of
bargaining rule We show that for the rules, the conclusion of Theorem 2 fail.
Example 7. Consider the case;
0
p0
0.5
p1
1
p2
Let p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1. Suppose that the social welfare function is φ(uS) =
1
|S| ·∑
i∈S
pi, and the bargaining rule is µ(u0, φ(uS)) =
φ(S) + p0
2
+ 2.
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and bargaining outcomes:
if S = {1, 2} then φ(uS) = 0.75, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 2.375
if S = {1} then φ(uS) = 0.5, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 2.25
if S = {2} then φ(uS) = 1, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 2.5
• S = {1, 2} is not stable because agent 2 will leave the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 2.375 to 2.25 which is closer to agent 2’s peak.
• S = {2} is not stable because agent 1 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 2.5 to 2.375 which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
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Hence {1} is the stable coalition.
In the following example, we will construct a bargaining rule and a social welfare
function that satisfies all assumptions of theorem 2 except social boundedness of
bargaining rule by social welfare function for some S, uS and i ∈ N \S, ui. We show
that for the rules, the conclusion of Theorem 2 fail.
Example 8. Consider the case;
0
p0
0.8
p1
1
p2
Let p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1. Suppose that the social welfare function is φ(uS) =
1
|S| ·∑
i∈S
pi, and the bargaining rule is µ(u0, φ(uS)) =
 φ(pS)/10 if φ(uS) ≤ 0.9φ(pS) otherwise
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and bargaining outcomes:
if S = {1, 2} then φ(uS) = 0.9, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.09
if S = {1} then φ(uS) = 0.8, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.08
if S = {2} then φ(uS) = 1, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 1
• S = {1, 2} is not stable because agent 1 will leave the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.09 to 1 which is closer to agent 1 ’s peak.
• S = {1} is not stable because agent 2 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0.08 to 0.09 which is closer to agent 2’s peak.
Hence {2} is the stable coalition.
In the following example, we will construct a bargaining rule and a social welfare
function that satisfies all assumptions of theorem 2 except preference monotonicity
of bargaining rule. We show that for the rules, the conclusion of Theorem 2 fail.
Example 9. Consider the case;
0
p0
0.5
p1
1
p2
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Let p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1. Suppose that the social welfare function is φ(uS) =
1
10|S| ·
∑
i∈S
pi, and the bargaining rule is µ(u0, φ(uS)) =

0.05 if φ(uS) = 0.05
0.074 if φ(uS) = 0.075
0.073 if φ(uS) = 0.1
0 otherwise
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and bargaining outcomes:
if S = {1, 2} then φ(uS) = 0.075, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.074
if S = {1} then φ(uS) = 0.05, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.05
if S = {2} then φ(uS) = 0.1, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.073
• S = {1, 2} is not stable because agent 1 will leave the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.074 to 0.073 which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
• S = {1} is not stable because agent 2 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0.073 to 0.074 which is closer to agent 2’s peak.
Hence {2} is the stable coalition.
In the following example, we will construct a bargaining rule and a social welfare
function that satisfies all assumptions of theorem 2 except population monotonicity
of social welfare function. We show that for the rules, the conclusion of Theorem 2
fail.
Example 10. Consider the case;
0
p0
0.5
p2
1
p2
Let p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1. Suppose that the social welfare function is
φ(uS) :=

φ(u{1,2}) = 0.6 if |N | = 3, p1 = 0.2, p2 = 0.5, p3 = 1
φ(u{1}) = 0.75 if |N | = 3, p1 = 0.2, p2 = 0.5, p3 = 1
φ(u{2}) = 0.56 if |N | = 3, p1 = 0.2, p2 = 0.5, p3 = 1
1
|S|
∑
i∈S⊆N
pi otherwise
,
22
and the bargaining rule is µ(u0, φ(uS)) = φ(uS)
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and bargaining outcomes:
if S = {1, 2} then φ(uS) = 0.6, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.6
if S = {1} then φ(uS) = 0.75, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.75
if S = {2} then φ(uS) = 0.56, µ(u0, φ((p2))) = 0.56
• S = {1, 2} is not stable because agent 1 will leave the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0,6 to 0,56 which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
Hence {2},{1} are stable coalitions.
In the following example, we will construct a bargaining rule and a social welfare
function that satisfies all assumptions of theorem 2 except µ(u0, φ(u{S})) ≥ pi for
some S, uS and i ∈ N \S, ui. We show that for the rules, the conclusion of Theorem
2 fail.
Example 11. Consider the case;
0
p0
0.5
p2
1
p2
Let p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1. Suppose that the social welfare function is φ(uS) =
1
|S|
∑
i∈S⊆N
pi, and the bargaining rule µ is µ(u0, φ(uS)) =
φ(S) + p0
5
.
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and bargaining outcomes:
if S = {1, 2} then φ(uS) = 0.75, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.15
if S = {1} then φ(uS) = 0.5, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.1
if S = {2} then φ(uS) = 1, µ(u0, φ((p2))) = 0.2
• S = {1, 2} is not stable because agent 1 will leave the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0,15 to 0,2 which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
• S = {1} is not stable because agent 2 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0,1 to 0,15 which is closer to agent 2’s peak.
Hence {2} is the stable coalition.
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In the following example, we will construct a bargaining rule and a social welfare
function that satisfies all assumptions of theorem 2 except |µ(p0, φ(u{S})) − pi| <
|φ(u{S}) − φ(uS∪{i})| for some S, uS and i ∈ N \ S, ui. We show that for the rules,
the conclusion of Theorem 2 fail.
Example 12. Consider the case;
0
p0 = p1
0.2
p2
1
p3
Let p1 = 0, p2 = 0.2, p3 = 1. Suppose that the social welfare function is
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
pi,
and µ(p0, φ(pS)) := (p0 + φ(pS))/0.4, and p1 = 0, p2 = 0.2, p3 = 1.
Lets check the possible coalitions and outcomes of bargaining:
if S = {1, 2, 3} then φ((p1, p2, p3)) = 0.4 and µ(p0, φ((p1, p2, p3))) = 0.16
if S = {2, 3} then φ((p2, p3)) = 0.6 and µ(p0, φ((p2, p3))) = 0.24
if S = {1, 3} then φ((p1, p3)) = 0.5 and µ(p0, φ((p1, p3))) = 0.2
if S = {1, 2} then φ((p1, p2)) = 0.1 and µ(p0, φ((p1, p2))) = 0.04
if S = {1} then φ((p1)) = 0 and µ(p0, φ((p1))) = 0
if S = {2} then φ((p2)) = 0.2 and µ(p0, φ((p2))) = 0.08
if S = {3} then φ((p3)) = 1 and µ(p0, φ((p3))) = 0.4
• S = {1, 2, 3} is not stable because agent 2 will leave the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.16 to 0.2 which is closer to agent 2’s peaks.
• S = {1, 2} is not stable because agent 3 will join the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.04 to 0.16 which is closer to agent 3’s peak.
• S = {2, 3} is not stable because agent 1 will join the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.24 to 0.16 which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
• S = {1} is not stable because agent 2 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0 to 0.04 which is closer to agent 2’s peaks.
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• S = {2} is not stable because agent 3 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0.08 to 0.24 which is closer to agent 3’s peak.
• S = {3} is not stable because agent 1 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0.4 to 0.2 which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
There will be a deviation from each coalition except S = {1, 3}.
? Examples 7-8-9-10-11-12 together show the necessity of the assumptions of
Theorem 2. These examples also show that the assumptions of theorem 2 does not
imply each other.
Note that we do not reach unique stable coalitions in both theorems. We need
stronger assumptions for unique stable coalitions. In other words, we need to impose
stronger assumptions such as strict inequalities and strict properties of the rules to
cancel out the indifference cases. Indifferent cases are the cases where there exists a
coalition S and an agent outside of the coalition such that agent’s utility is indifferent
to being a member of a coalition or not. Once we achieve the uniqueness of the stable
coalition, we will have the desired result; unique grand coalition. Because Theorem
1&2 together show that grand coalition can be achieved under certain assumptions.
We have discussed the issues in Chapter 6, subcapter 6.0.3.
The next lemma will eliminate the dictatorship of the principal that is µ(u0, φ(uS)) 6=
0. And it will be necessary to prove Theorem 3.
Lemma 3. If µ is strictly preference monotonic and Pareto efficient then
µ(u0, u1) 6= 0 ∀p1 > 0 and for p0 = 0
Proof. Lets take any u1 ∈ U such that p1 > 0 and take p0 = 0, so we have p0 < p1.
Since µ is Pareto efficient, µ(u0, u0) = 0. Since µ is strictly preference monotonic
and p0 < p1 , 0 = µ(u0, u0) < µ(u0, u1). Hence µ(u0, u1) 6= 0 ∀p1 > 0 and for
p0 = 0.
Now I will provide some graphs about the numeric analysis of our representative
coalition model. First I take bargaining rule µ(p0, φ(pS)) :=
(p0+φ(pS))
2
, and social
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welfare function 1|S|
∑
i∈S pi where S ⊆ N := {1, 2, 3}. The x-axis represents the
peaks of agent 1 and the y-axis represents the peaks of agent 2, and the peak of
agent 3 is equal to 1. Then I generate a MatLab code. To generate the code, first I
defined the trivial condition which is p1 < p2 < p3 = 1, then I defined the conditions
of stability for each coalition. For example; if agent 1 prefers {1, 3} to {3} and agent
2 prefers {1, 3} to {1, 2, 3} and agent 3 prefers {1, 3} to {1} then {1, 3} is the stable
coalition. To draw the figures, I add satisfying points for each coalition on the same
figure. The red area between the blue areas at the figure 4.1 represents the cases of
unconnected coalitions.
Figure 4.1: Two dimensional
The figure 4.2 represents a three dimensional example. The bargaining rule is
µ(p0, φ(pS)) :=
(p0+φ(pS))
2
, and the social welfare function is 1|S|
∑
i∈S
pi where S ⊆
N := {1, 2, 3}. The coding is the same as in the previous figure except I do not take
p3 = 1. Here I change the trivial condition with p1 < p2 < p3. And I add a z-axis
which represents the peaks of agent 3. As in the previous figure, we again observe
unconnected coalitions.
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Figure 4.2: Three dimensional
Both figures provide unconnected coalitions, and give the indication of impossibil-
ity of connected coalition under certain assumptions. Because in both figures, there
are preference profiles which only construct unconnected {1, 3} coalition. Therefore
if we want to reach an unconnected coalition, then we need to construct a preference
profile that will give us unique unconnected stable coalition. We also need some
restrictions over bargaining and social welfare functions.
Theorem 3. Suppose that N := {1, 2, 3}. Let φ be a strictly population monotonic,
Pareto efficient social welfare function, let µ be a Pareto efficient and strictly pref-
erence monotonic bargaining rule. If φ(u{1,3}) 6= µ(u0, φ(u{1,3})), then there exists
preference profile under which the unique stable coalition is unconnected.
Proof. We are going to construct a u ∈ U3 that satisfies our claim. To construct a
specific u, we need to define peaks for each agent that satisfies the properties;
(i) Agent 2 prefers {1, 3} to {1, 2, 3}
(ii) Agent 1 prefers {1, 3} to {3}
(iii) Agent 3 prefers {1, 3} to {1}
Lets start with agent 1 , and take p1 = 0. We have located p1, now we are going to
locate p3. Take any p3 ∈ [0, 1] such that p1 < p3. Now we have the case;
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p1
p0 = 0 p3
1
Since φ is strictly population monotonic, φ(u{1,3}) > 0. Since µ is strictly prefer-
ence monotonic, Pareto efficient and φ(u{1,3}) > 0, by lemma 3
µ(p0, φ(u{1,3}) > µ(p0, φ(u{1}) = 0. Now we have φ(u{1,3}) > 0 and µ(p0, φ(u{1,3}) >
0. Since µ is Pareto optimal and φ(u{1,3}) 6= µ(u0, φ(u{1,3})), µ(p0, φ(u{1,3}) <
φ(u{1,3}).
So we have the case;
p1
p0 = 0
µ(p0, φ(u{1,3})
φ(u{1,3}) p3
1
Now we need to locate the peak of agent 2. Take any p2 ∈ [µ(p0, φ(u{1,3}), φ(u{1,3})).
p1
p0 = 0
µ(p0, φ(u{1,3})
p2 φ(u{1,3}) p3
1
Since φ is strictly population monotonic, φ(u{1,3}) > φ(u{1,2,3}) ≥ p2. So from strict
preference monotonicity of bargaining rule and φ(u{1,3}) > φ(u{1,2,3}) , it is clear that
µ(p0, φ(u{1,3}) > µ(p0, φ(u{1,2,3}).
p1
p0 = 0 µ(p0, φ(u{1,2,3})
µ(p0, φ(u{1,3})
p2
φ(u{1,2,3})
φ(u{1,3}) p3
1
Hence |µ(p0, φ(u{1,2,3}) − p2| > |µ(p0, φ(u{1,3}) − p2| which means agent 2 prefers
{1, 3} to {1, 2, 3}. From Proposition 1, we know that agent 3 will join the coalition
{1} that is agent 3 prefers {1, 3} to {1}. Since φ is strictly population monotonic,
φ(u{1,3}) < φ(u{3}). From strict preference monotonicity of bargaining rule and
φ(u{1,3}) < φ(u{3}), µ(p0, φ(u{1,3}) < µ(p0, φ(u{3}). So agent 1 prefers {1, 3} to
{3}.
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4.0.2 Non-Representative Coalition
While as in the baseline model, only a single coalition can form, this coalition is not
a representation of the agents who prefers not to join it. Instead each such agent
individually bargain with the principal and receives the corresponding outcome. The
coalition formation process similar to previous item; each agent declares whether she
wants to be a member of the coalition or not.
Theorem 4. If the bargaining rule µ is strict preference monotonic, Pareto efficient
and the social welfare function φ is strict population monotonic, Pareto efficient and
∃ i 6= j ∈ N such that pi 6= pj then each agent will bargain individually with the
principal.
Proof. Suppose there are |N | = n agents and a principal, and suppose ∃ i 6= j ∈ N
such that pi 6= pj. Since the social welfare function is strictly population monotonic,
Pareto efficient and ∃ i 6= j ∈ N such that pi 6= pj, φ(uS∪{n}) < φ(un), ∀S ⊆ N
with n 6∈ S and pn is the largest peak. Since the bargaining rule is strictly preference
monotonic, Pareto efficient and φ(uS∪{n}) < φ(un), µ(p0, φ(uS∪{n})) < µ(p0, φ(un)) <
pn, ∀S ⊆ N with n 6∈ S and pn is the largest peak. Hence un(µ(p0, φ(un))) >
un(µ(p0, φ(uS∪{n}))) ∀S ⊆ N with n 6∈ S and pn is the largest peak. Therefore agent
n will bargain individually. Since agent n will bargain individually, agent n-1 (agent
with the second largest peak) will bargain individually too because of the same logic
as agent n. By repeating this sequence n times, we can see that each agent will
bargain individually.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The literature over cooperative bargaining and coalition formation consist of models
designed on private goods. In this thesis, we focus on public good bargaining situ-
ations. And we ask the following questions :“What would be the interplay between
bargaining and coalition formation? Under what conditions is the coalition of all
agents, the grand coalition, stable?” Therefore the objectives of this study is mainly
studying the interplay between the bargaining and coalition formation processes,
and investigating the incentives that will lead to the grand coalition. Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2 together shows that the grand coalition can be achieved, under certain
assumptions over the bargaining rule and the social welfare function. In representa-
tive coalition model, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 together shows that grand coalition
can be constructed.
The third theorem is an impossibility theorem for connected coalitions. Theorem
3 shows the impossibility of grand coalition for |N | = 3. It’s assumptions gives us the
conditions for unconnected coalitions: Strict population monotonicity of the social
welfare function φ, and Pareto efficiency and strict preference monotonicity of the
bargaining rule µ, and φ(u{1,3}) 6= µ(u0, φ(u{1,3})). Moreover this theorem indicates
that conventional wisdom fails even under strong assumptions such as Pareto effi-
ciency and monotonicity.
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And Finally Theorem 4 shows that we can not produce a grand coalition if we
allow agents a choice between individual and collective bargaining. whenever the
bargaining rule µ is preference monotonic, Pareto efficient and the social welfare
function φ is population monotonic, Pareto efficient.
Throughout the thesis, we see different types of social welfare functions and bar-
gaining rules in the examples of Results Chapter and Appendix. Now we are going
to analyze the properties of these rules. Population monotonicity was specifically
defined for social welfare functions. If an agent decides to join a coalition S when-
ever the social welfare function is population monotonic, then the agent is better of
by joining the coalition S. Hence population monotonicity categorizes social welfare
functions with respect to agents preferences. Strictly population monotonicity def-
inition eliminates some indifference cases which means an agent can be indifferent
between being a coalition member or not. Since indifference eliminates uniqueness,
we have defined the strict version.
Population monotonicity is applicable to bargaining rule, but if we suppose such
a property then our model becomes trivial. If an agent will be better off by joining
the coalition, then trivially she will join the coalition. Hence we need a different
type of property. Preference monotonicity is a monotonicity definition which aims
to preserve order. And the strict version is a standard strict monotonicity definition.
Pareto efficiency is a standard property in bargaining literature. And it is applicable
to both rules.
Now I am going to analyze each social welfare function and bargaining rule that
has been used in this thesis. There are two tables in the next pages. Table 5.1 is
designed to analyze the social welfare functions. And table 5.2 is designed to analyze
the bargaining rules. In the first table, the first column is the column of social choice
and in the second table, the first column is the column of bargaining rules. And rest
of the columns are properties of these rules. The tables are rotated to fit the pages.
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The most well known bargaining rule is the Nash bargaining rule which was
proposed by Nash(1950) [21]. The Nash bargaining rule maximizes the product of
each negotiators’ utility gain with respect to their disagreement payoffs. Formally
the Nash bargaining rule is N : B → RN such that
N(S, d) := argmax
x∈I(S,d)
n∏
i=1
(ui(x)− ui(d))
where S ⊂ RN is the feasible payoff set, d ∈ RN is the disagreement vector, I(S, d) :=
{x ∈ S | x ≥ d} (the individually rational set), and B is the set of (S, d)s or the set
of bargaining problems (S, d).
Consider a bargaining process of two agents with symmetric single peaked pref-
erences as in the representative model in section 4.0.1 such that p1 = 0 and p2 = 1.
0
p0
1
p1
The utilities of the agents are u0(x) : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that u0(x) = −|x| and
u1(x) : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that u1(x) = −|1− x| and u0(d) = u1(d) = −1. If agents
face a disagreement then d is the bargaining outcome. So the utilities of the agents
are;
-1=u1 = u2
0 = p1 0.5 1
p2
d
The x-axis indicates the points agent 1 and 2 bargain about. The y-axis indicates
the utility levels of bargainers for each point in [0,1]. Now we are going to determine
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the Nash solution with these assumptions.
argmax
x∈I(S,d)
1∏
i=0
(ui(x)− ui(d)) = argmax
x∈I(S,d)
(u0(x)− u0(d))(u1(x)− u1(d))
By Lagrangian maximization we deduce that, x = 0.5. If we change p0 and p1 and
do the same process, then we will observe that x = p0+p1
2
. Hence in this thesis, the
Nash bargaining rule is the bargaining rule µ such that µ(u0, φ(uS)) =
φ(uS)+u0
2
.
One of the future work of this thesis can be changing the structure of the utilities
or the preferences of the agents. Altering the agents’ preferences to non-symmetric
preferences may cause different formations of coalitions. What would be the proper-
ties that will form us the grand coalition in that environment? What would be the
properties that will form us the unique unconnected coalition in that environment?
The altering of the utility has different aspects. We can impose utility function
with higher orders. Or we can impose a second dimension to our policy spectrum.
Consider introducing money dimension to our policy spectrum. Now we have two
dimensional spectrum. Each agent is endowed with some amount of money and they
bargain over a tariff rate. The effect of money and tariff rate can be equal or different
over agents’ utilities.
Throughout the paper we assume that p0 = 0 and the peaks of the agents’ are
greater then 0. We can alter this property by locating principal’s peak (p0) between
agents’ peak. For example, suppose that we have a society with three agents and a
principal such as p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p0 ≤ p3. Can we still achieve a grand coalition or an
unconnected coalition?
We did not assume continuum of agents. We can observe that when we assume
such a property, a single agent does not have an impact over bargaining outcome.
And this assumption may change the results of the thesis.
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Chapter 6
Appendix
6.0.3 Discussion over Uniqueness and Grand Coalition
We did not impose strict property to preference monotonicity of bargaining rule and
population monotonicity of social welfare function at Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
We proved more general cases of these theorems. But this generality also gives us
indifferent cases. Indifferent cases are the cases where there exists a coalition S
and an agent outside of the coalition such that agent’s utility is indifferent to being
a member of a coalition or not. Moreover, indifference cases gives us multiple stable
coalitions. Imposing strict property to preference monotonicity of bargaining rule
and population monotonicity of social welfare function eliminates some indifferent
cases. We can still observe multiple stable coalitions even with strict preference
monotonicity of the bargaining rule and strict population monotonicity of social
welfare function. To examine the effects of strict properties, I will provide three
examples. In the next three examples, for all i ∈ N , ui ∈ U will be fixed that
is peaks of the agents’ will be fixed in all three examples. I will just change the
bargaining and social welfare functions.
In the following example, I will provide an example such that the bargaining
rule µ is strictly preference monotonic and the social welfare function is population
monotonic but not strictly population monotonic.
Example 13. Consider the case;
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0
p0
0.5
p2
1
p2
Let p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1. Suppose that the social welfare function is φ(uS) =
max{pi| i ∈ S}, and the bargaining rule is µ(u0, φ(uS)) = φ(S) + p0
2
.
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and bargaining outcomes:
if S = {1, 2} then φ(uS) = 1, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.25
if S = {1} then φ(uS) = 0.5, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0.5
if S = {2} then φ(uS) = 1, µ(u0, φ((p2))) = 0.5
• S = {1} is not stable because agent 2 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0,25 to 0,5 which is closer to agent 2’s peak.
Hence {1, 2}, {2} are stable coalitions.
In the following example, I will provide an example such that the bargaining
rule µ is preference monotonic but not strictly preference monotonic and the social
welfare function is strictly population monotonic.
Example 14. Consider the case;
0
p0
0.5
p2
1
p2
Let p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1. Suppose that the social welfare function is φ(uS) =
1
|S|
∑
i∈S⊆N
pi, and the bargaining rule is µ(u0, φ(uS)) = p0 = 0.
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and bargaining outcomes:
if S = {1, 2} then φ(uS) = 0.75, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0
if S = {1} then φ(uS) = 0.5, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0
if S = {2} then φ(uS) = 1, µ(u0, φ((p2))) = 0
Hence all coalitions are stable coalitions.
In the following example, I will provide an example such that the bargaining rule
µ is preference monotonic and the social welfare function is population monotonic.
I will drop the strict properties.
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Example 15. Consider the case;
0
p0
0.5
p2
1
p2
Let p1 = 0.5, p2 = 1. Suppose that the social welfare function is φ(uS) =
max{pi| i ∈ S}, and the bargaining rule is µ(u0, φ(uS)) = p0 = 0.
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and bargaining outcomes:
if S = {1, 2} then φ(uS) = 1, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0
if S = {1} then φ(uS) = 0.5, µ(u0, φ(uS)) = 0
if S = {2} then φ(uS) = 1, µ(u0, φ((p2))) = 0
Hence all coalitions are stable coalitions.
We see that there are indifference of utilities of the agents’ in all the examples
13-14-15. As I mentioned before, we can still observe multiple stable coalitions
even with strict preference monotonicity of the bargaining rule and strict population
monotonicity of social welfare function. In the folloing example, I will provide a
case shows that even strict preference monotonicity of the bargaining rule and strict
population monotonicity of social welfare function is not enough for unique stable
coalition happens to be grand.
Example 16. Consider the case;
0 0.2
p1
0.6
p2
1
p3
Let p1 = 0.2, p2 = 0.6, p3 = 1. Suppose that the social welfare function is
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
pi, and the bargaining rule is µ(u0, φ(uS)) =
φ(S) + p0
2
.
Now let’s check the possible coalitions and outcomes of bargaining:
if S = {1, 2, 3} then φ((p1, p2, p3)) = 0.6 and µ(p0, φ((p1, p2, p3))) = 0.3
if S = {2, 3} then φ((p2, p3)) = 0.8 and µ(p0, φ((p2, p3))) = 0.4
if S = {1, 3} then φ((p1, p3)) = 0.6 and µ(p0, φ((p1, p3))) = 0.3
if S = {1, 2} then φ((p1, p2)) = 0.4 and µ(p0, φ((p1, p2))) = 0.2
38
if S = {1} then φ((p1)) = 0.2 and µ(p0, φ((p1))) = 0.1
if S = {2} then φ((p2)) = 0.6 and µ(p0, φ((p2))) = 0.3
if S = {3} then φ((p3)) = 1 and µ(p0, φ((p3))) = 0.5
• S = {1, 2} is not stable because agent 3 will join the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.2 to 0.3 which is closer to agent 3’s peak.
• S = {2, 3} is not stable because agent 1 will join the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.4 to 0.3 which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
• S = {1} is not stable because agent 2 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0.1 to 0.2 which is closer to agent 2’s peaks.
• S = {2} is not stable because agent 3 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0.3 to 0.4 which is closer to agent 3’s peak.
• S = {3} is not stable because agent 1 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0.5 to 0.3 which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
There will be a deviation from each coalition except S = {1, 3}, S = {1, 2, 3}.
? Examples 13-14-15-16 together show that strict population monotonicity of so-
cial welfare function and strict preference monotonicity of bargaining rule eliminates
some indifference cases but not all of them. As I mentioned before, we need to impose
some other properties. To discuss this issue, I will focus Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
properties seperately.
Theorem 1 has three assumptions; preference monotonicity and Pareto efficiency
of bargaining rule, population monotonicity of social welfare function, and pi ≥ φ(uS)
where i 6∈ S. In Example 16, we observe that imposing strict property to preference
monotonicity and population monotonicity is not enough to eliminate indifference
cases. And we also observe that 0.6 = pi ≥ φ(uS) = 0.6. Now I will give an example
with pi > φ(uS) where i 6∈ S.
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Example 17. Consider the case;
0 0.2
p1
0.8
p2
1
p3
Let p1 = 0.2, p2 = 0.8, p3 = 1. Suppose that the social welfare function is
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
pi, and the bargaining rule is µ(u0, φ(uS)) =
φ(S) + p0
2
.
Let’s check the possible coalitions and outcomes of bargaining:
if S = {1, 2, 3} then φ((p1, p2, p3)) = 0.6¯ and µ(p0, φ((p1, p2, p3))) = 0.3¯
if S = {2, 3} then φ((p2, p3)) = 0.9 and µ(p0, φ((p2, p3))) = 0.45
if S = {1, 3} then φ((p1, p3)) = 0.6 and µ(p0, φ((p1, p3))) = 0.3
if S = {1, 2} then φ((p1, p2)) = 0.5 and µ(p0, φ((p1, p2))) = 0.25
if S = {1} then φ((p1)) = 0.2 and µ(p0, φ((p1))) = 0.1
if S = {2} then φ((p2)) = 0.8 and µ(p0, φ((p2))) = 0.4
if S = {3} then φ((p3)) = 1 and µ(p0, φ((p3))) = 0.5
• S = {1, 3} is not stable because agent 2 will join the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.3 to 0.3¯ which is closer to agent 2’s peak.
• S = {1, 2} is not stable because agent 3 will join the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.25 to 0.3¯ which is closer to agent 3’s peak.
• S = {2, 3} is not stable because agent 1 will join the coalition to move the
bargaining outcome from 0.45 to 0.3¯ which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
• S = {1} is not stable because agent 2 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0.1 to 0.25 which is closer to agent 2’s peaks.
• S = {2} is not stable because agent 3 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0.4 to 0.45 which is closer to agent 3’s peak.
• S = {3} is not stable because agent 1 will join the coalition to move the bar-
gaining outcome from 0.5 to 0.3 which is closer to agent 1’s peak.
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There will be a deviation from each coalition except S = {1, 2, 3}.
By imposing strict property, we only get rid off some cases that gives us multiple
stable coalitions. To eliminate all the indifference cases, we need to impose more
properties along with strict properties of population and preference monotonicity.
In example 17, we observe no indifference cases when we impose pi > φ(uS) where
i 6∈ S. Hence we reach a unique coalition. Therefore for the cases pi > φ(uS) where
i 6∈ S if bargaining rule is strictly preference monotonic, Pareto efficient, and social
welfare function is strictly population monotonic, we reach a unique stable coalition.
We also observe that the unique stable coalition is the grand coalition for example
17. To achieve unique stable coalition which is grand, we also need the assumptions
of Theorem 2 because we can not know what would happen if pi < φ(uS) where
i 6∈ S. Therefore, I will discuss the assumptions of Theorem 1 which covers the cases
pi < φ(uS) where i 6∈ S. My aim is to understand the assumptions that lead us to
the unique coalition happens to be grand.
Along with Theorem 1 assumptions, Theorem 2 has some other assumptions too:
For S ⊆ N , uS ∈ U |S| and for i ∈ N \ S, ui ∈ U that satisfies the sociall bound-
edness of µ by φ, µ(p0, φ(uS)) ≥ pi, and |µ(p0, φ(uS)) − pi| ≥ |φ(uS) − φ(uS∪{i})|.
And also remember, we should assume that bargaining rule is strictly preference
monotonic, Pareto efficient, and social welfare function is strictly population mono-
tonic to avoid some indifference cases (Check Examples 13-14-15-16). Now we have
discussed the cases whenever pi ≥ φ(uS) where i 6∈ S. So we are going to check
the cases for pi < φ(uS) where i 6∈ S. Since φ is strictly population monotonic and
pi < φ(uS) where i 6∈ S, pi < φ(uS∪{i}) < φ(uS). Since µ is strictly preference mono-
tonic and pi < φ(uS∪{i}) < φ(uS), µ(p0, φ(uS∪{i})) < pi whenever µ(p0, φ(uS)) = pi.
Hence agent i does not join the coalition S, so we have to assume µ(p0, φ(uS)) > pi
where i 6∈ S. Now two property left; socially boundedness and |µ(p0, φ(uS))− pi| ≥
|φ(uS)−φ(uS∪{i})|. We can not impose a strictness to social boundedness. So we need
to investigate on |µ(p0, φ(uS))− pi| ≥ |φ(uS)− φ(uS∪{i})|. From social boundedness
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we know that there exists S ⊆ N , uS ∈ U |S| and there exists i ∈ N \ S, ui ∈ U such
that |φ(uS)−φ(uS∪{i})| ≥ |µ(u0, φ(uS))−µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))|, and for the same S ⊆ N ,
uS ∈ U |S| and i ∈ N \ S, ui ∈ U we have |µ(p0, φ(uS)) − pi| ≥ |φ(uS) − φ(uS∪{i})|.
Hence we have |µ(p0, φ(uS)) − pi| ≥ |µ(u0, φ(uS)) − µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))|. This inequal-
ity can lead us indifference of agent i to be inside or outside of S. Since we impose
pi < µ(u0, φ(uS)), the indifference of agent i happens only whenever |µ(u0, φ(uS))−
µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))| = 0. Since bargaining rule is strictly preference monotonic, Pareto
efficient, and φ is strictly population monotonic and pi < µ(u0, φ(uS)) ≤ φ(uS),
|µ(u0, φ(uS))− µ(u0, φ(uS∪{i}))| 6= 0. Hence we eliminate all indifference cases. And
if the bargaining rule is strictly preference monotonic, Pareto efficient, and the social
welfare function is strictly population monotonic, and for S ⊆ N , uS ∈ U |S| and for
i ∈ N \ S, ui ∈ U such that µ is socially bounded by φ, µ(p0, φ(uS)) > pi, and
|µ(p0, φ(uS)) − pi| ≥ |φ(uS) − φ(uS∪{i})| then agent i will better off by joining the
coalition S.
To sum up, we have classified the assumptions to achieve a unique grand coalition:
• If pi > φ(uS) where i 6∈ S, then we need the assumptions strict preference
monotonicity and Pareto efficiency of bargaining rule and strict population
monotonicity of social welfare function.
• If pi < φ(uS) where i 6∈ S, then we need the assumptions strict preference
monotonicity and Pareto efficiency of bargaining rule, and strict population
monotonicity of social welfare function, and for S ⊆ N , uS ∈ U |S| with i ∈ N\S
such that µ is socially bounded by φ, µ(p0, φ(uS)) > pi, and |µ(p0, φ(uS))−pi| ≥
|φ(uS)− φ(uS∪{i})|.
6.0.4 Matlab Code
I construct a numeric analysis for our representative model. As I mentioned before
we can observe unconnected coalitions at the graphs. I both construct a 2 dimen-
sional and 3 dimensional graphs in MatLab format. Here I will provide the codes;
42
The code for 2-d
pL1X = [];
pL1Y = [];
pL2X = [];
pL2Y = [];
pL3X = [];
pL3Y = [];
pL4X = [];
pL4Y = [];
pL5X = [];
pL5Y = [];
pL6X = [];
pL6Y = [];
pL7X = [];
pL7Y = [];
curInd1 = 1;
curInd2 = 1;
curInd3 = 1;
curInd4 = 1;
curInd5 = 1;
curInd6 = 1;
curInd7 = 1;
% Search the grid
for p1 = 0:0.01:1
for p2 = 0:0.01:1
% Other variables
x1 = p1/2;
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x2 = p2/2;
x3 = 0.5;
x4 = (p1+p2)/4;
x5 = (p1+1)/4;
x6 = (p2+1)/4;
x7 = (p1+p2+1)/6;
% Conditions for {1,2,3}
cond1 = p1 < p2;
% Agent 1 prefers {1,2,3} to {2,3}
cond2 = (abs(x7-p1) < abs(x6-p1));
% Agent 2 prefers {1,2,3} to {1,3}
cond3 = (abs(x7-p2) < abs(x5-p2));
% Agent 3 prefers {1,2,3} to {1,2}
cond4 = (abs(x7-1) < abs(x4-1)) ;
if cond1 && cond2 && cond3 && cond4
pL1X(curInd1) = p1;
pL1Y(curInd1) = p2;
curInd1 = curInd1+1;
end
% Conditions for {1,3}
cond1 = p1 < p2 && p2 < p3;
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% Agent 1 prefers {1,3} to {3}
cond2 = (abs(x5-p1) < abs(x3-p1));
% Agent 2 prefers {1,3} to {1,2,3}
cond3 = (abs(x5-p2)-10^-15 <= abs(x7-p2));
% Agent 3 prefers {1,3} to {1}
cond4 = (abs(x5-1) < abs(x1-1));
if cond1 && cond2 && cond3 && cond4
pL2X(curInd2) = p1;
pL2Y(curInd2) = p2;
curInd2 = curInd2+1;
end
% Conditions for {2,3}
cond1 = p1 < p2;
% Agent 2 prefers {2,3} to {3}
cond2 = (abs(x6-p2) < abs(x3-p2));
% Agent 3 prefers {2,3} to {2}
cond3 = (abs(x6-1) < abs(x2-1));
% Agent 1 prefers {2,3} to {1,2,3}
cond4 = (abs(x6-p1) < abs(x7-p1));
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if cond1 && cond2 && cond3 && cond4
pL3X(curInd3) = p1;
pL3Y(curInd3) = p2;
curInd3 = curInd3+1;
end
% Conditions for {1,2}
cond1 = p1 < p2;
% Agent 1 prefers {1,2} to {2}
cond2 = (abs(x4-p1) < abs(x2-p1));
% Agent 2 prefers {1,2} to {1}
cond3 = (abs(x4-p2) < abs(x1-p2));
% Agent 3 prefers {1,2} to {1,2,3}
cond4 = (abs(x4-1) < abs(x7-1));
if cond1 && cond2 && cond3 && cond4
pL5X(curInd5) = p1;
pL5Y(curInd5) = p2;
curInd5 = curInd5+1;
end
% Conditions for {1}
cond1 = p1 < p2;
% Agent 2 prefers {1} to {1,2}
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cond2 = (abs(x1-p2) < abs(x4-p2));
% Agent 3 prefers {1} to {1,3}
cond3 = (abs(x1-1) < abs(x5-1));
if cond1 && cond2 && cond3
pL6X(curInd6) = p1;
pL6Y(curInd6) = p2;
curInd6 = curInd6+1;
end
% Conditions for {2}
cond1 = p1 < p2;
% Agent 1 prefers {2} to {1,2}
cond2 = (abs(x2-p1) < abs(x4-p1));
% Agent 3 prefers {2} to {2,3}
cond3 = (abs(x2-1) < abs(x6-1));
if cond1 && cond2 && cond3
pL7X(curInd7) = p1;
pL7Y(curInd7) = p2;
curInd7 = curInd7+1;
end
% Conditions for {3}
cond1 = p1 < p2;
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% Agent 1 prefers {3} to {1,3}
cond2 = (abs(x3-p1) < abs(x5-p1));
% Agent 2 prefers {3} to {2,3}
cond3 = (abs(x3-p2) < abs(x6-p2));
if cond1 && cond2 && cond3
pL4X(curInd4) = p1;
pL4Y(curInd4) = p2;
curInd4 = curInd4+1;
end
end
end
% Plot the results
scatter(pL1X,pL1Y,’b.’);
hold on;
scatter(pL2X,pL2Y,’rx’);
scatter(pL3X,pL3Y,’go’);
scatter(pL4X,pL4Y,’m+’);
scatter(pL5X,pL5Y,’k*’);
scatter(pL6X,pL6Y,’ys’);
scatter(pL7X,pL7Y,’cd’);
% Legends
legend(’{1,2,3}’,’{1,3}’,’{2,3}’,’{3}’,’{1,2}’,’{1}’,’{2}’);
xlabel(’p1’);
ylabel(’p2’);
title(’Satisfying Points’);
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% Graph settings
xlim([0 1]);
ylim([0 1]);
grid on;
grid minor;
The code for 3-d
pL1X = [];
pL1Y = [];
pL1Z = [];
pL2X = [];
pL2Y = [];
pL2Z = [];
pL3X = [];
pL3Y = [];
pL3Z = [];
pL4X = [];
pL4Y = [];
pL4Z = [];
pL5X = [];
pL5Y = [];
pL5Z = [];
pL6X = [];
pL6Y = [];
pL6Z = [];
pL7X = [];
pL7Y = [];
pL7Z = [];
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curInd1 = 1;
curInd2 = 1;
curInd3 = 1;
curInd4 = 1;
curInd5 = 1;
curInd6 = 1;
curInd7 = 1;
Search the grid
for p1 = 0:0.05:1
for p2 = 0:0.05:1
for p3 = 0:0.05:1
% Other variables
x1 = p1/2;
x2 = p2/2;
x3 = p3/2;
x4 = (p1+p2)/4;
x5 = (p1+p3)/4;
x6 = (p2+p3)/4;
x7 = (p1+p2+p3)/6;
% Conditions for {1,2,3}
cond1 = p1 < p2 && p2 < p3;
% Agent 1 prefers {1,2,3} to {2,3}
cond2 = (abs(x7-p1) < abs(x6-p1));
% Agent 2 prefers {1,2,3} to {1,3}
cond3 = (abs(x7-p2) < abs(x5-p2));
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% Agent 3 prefers {1,2,3} to {1,2}
cond4 = (abs(x7-p3) < abs(x4-p3)) ;
if cond1 && cond2 && cond3 && cond4
pL1X(curInd1) = p1;
pL1Y(curInd1) = p2;
pL1Z(curInd1) = p3;
curInd1 = curInd1+1;
end
% Conditions for {1,3}
cond1 = p1 < p2 && p2 < p3;
% Agent 1 prefers {1,3} to {3}
cond2 = (abs(x5-p1) < abs(x3-p1));
% Agent 2 prefers {1,3} to {1,2,3}
cond3 = (abs(x5-p2)-10^-15 <= abs(x7-p2));
% Agent 3 prefers {1,3} to {1}
cond4 = (abs(x5-p3) < abs(x1-p3));
if cond1 && cond2 && cond3 && cond4
pL2X(curInd2) = p1;
pL2Y(curInd2) = p2;
pL2Z(curInd2) = p3;
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curInd2 = curInd2+1;
end
% Conditions for {2,3}
cond1 = p1 < p2 && p2 < p3;
% Agent 2 prefers {2,3} to {3}
cond2 = (abs(x6-p2) < abs(x3-p2));
% Agent 3 prefers {2,3} to {2}
cond3 = (abs(x6-p3) < abs(x2-p3));
% Agent 1 prefers {2,3} to {1,2,3}
cond4 = (abs(x6-p1) < abs(x7-p1));
if cond1 && cond2 && cond3 && cond4
pL3X(curInd3) = p1;
pL3Y(curInd3) = p2;
pL3Z(curInd3) = p3;
curInd3 = curInd3+1;
end
% Conditions for {1,2}
cond1 = p1 < p2 && p2 < p3;
% Agent 1 prefers {1,2} to {2}
cond2 = (abs(x4-p1) < abs(x2-p1));
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% Agent 2 prefers {1,2} to {1}
cond3 = (abs(x4-p2) < abs(x1-p2));
% Agent 3 prefers {1,2} to {1,2,3}
cond4 = (abs(x4-p3) < abs(x7-p3));
if cond1 && cond2 && cond3 && cond4
pL5X(curInd5) = p1;
pL5Y(curInd5) = p2;
pL5Z(curInd5) = p3;
curInd5 = curInd5+1;
end
% Conditions for {1}
cond1 = p1 < p2 && p2 < p3;
% Agent 2 prefers {1} to {1,2}
cond2 = (abs(x1-p2) < abs(x4-p2));
% Agent 3 prefers {1} to {1,3}
cond3 = (abs(x1-p3) < abs(x5-p3));
if cond1 && cond2 && cond3
pL6X(curInd6) = p1;
pL6Y(curInd6) = p2;
pL6Z(curInd6) = p3;
53
curInd6 = curInd6+1;
end
% Conditions for {2}
cond1 = p1 < p2 && p2 < p3;
% Agent 1 prefers {2} to {1,2}
cond2 = (abs(x2-p1) < abs(x4-p1));
% Agent 3 prefers {2} to {2,3}
cond3 = (abs(x2-p3) < abs(x6-p3));
if cond1 && cond2 && cond3
pL7X(curInd7) = p1;
pL7Y(curInd7) = p2;
pL7Z(curInd7) = p3;
curInd7 = curInd7+1;
end
% Conditions for {3}
cond1 = p1 < p2 && p2 < p3;
% Agent 1 prefers {3} to {1,3}
cond2 = (abs(x3-p1) < abs(x5-p1));
% Agent 2 prefers {3} to {2,3}
cond3 = (abs(x3-p2) < abs(x6-p2));
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if cond1 && cond2 && cond3
pL4X(curInd4) = p1;
pL4Y(curInd4) = p2;
pL4Z(curInd4) = p3;
curInd4 = curInd4+1;
end
end
end
end
% Plot the results
scatter3(pL1X,pL1Y,pL1Z,’b.’);
hold on;
scatter3(pL2X,pL2Y,pL2Z,’rx’);
scatter3(pL3X,pL3Y,pL3Z,’go’);
scatter3(pL4X,pL4Y,pL4Z,’m+’);
scatter3(pL5X,pL5Y,pL5Z,’k*’);
scatter3(pL6X,pL6Y,pL6Z,’ys’);
scatter3(pL7X,pL7Y,pL7Z,’cd’);
% Legends
legend(’{1,2,3}’,’{1,3}’,’{2,3}’,’{3}’,’{1,2}’,’{1}’,’{2}’);
xlabel(’p1’);
ylabel(’p2’);
zlabel(’p3’);
title(’Satisfying Points’);
% Graph settings
xlim([0 1]);
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ylim([0 1]);
zlim([0 1]);
grid on;
grid minor;
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